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Abstract 
 
The present thesis examines how the obligation to make reparation is allocated 
among multiple responsible actors before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
and beyond. It starts from an analysis of the applicable rules and principles on the 
obligation to make reparation and the law of remedies in international law and 
before various judicial institutions. It then turns to the various typologies of cases 
involving multiple responsible actors as well as to an examination of the principle 
of joint and several responsibility. Finally, it inquires how the ICJ (primarily) and 
other international courts and tribunals have dealt with such cases in their broader 
jurisdictional context and taking into consideration their approach to remedies 
generally. 
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I. Introduction 
The work of the International Law Commission (ILC) on international responsibility was 
the most long-lasting and one of the most complex codification projects that the 
Commission had grappled with since its creation in 1947.1 James Crawford, the last 
Special Rapporteur of the ILC on the topic, has summarized its work as follows:2  
The topic of State responsibility is one of the most important topics undertaken by 
the ILC. It has also taken longest to finish. The Articles on Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts seek to respond fairly and fully to the comments 
made by governments and others, and to the issues engaged. Adopted without a 
vote and with consensus on virtually all points, it accurately reflects the balance of 
opinion within the ILC following prolonged discussion and debate over several 
decades, and intensively since 1992.  
When the project finally came to fruition in 2001 with the adoption of the Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (‘ARSIWA’),3 and later in 2011 
with the adoption of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations, there were many successes to be counted. Having retained in the final 
product of its work the distinction between primary and secondary rules of international 
law as conceptualised by the Second Special Rapporteur Roberto Ago,  the ILC avoided 
the difficult discussion regarding the content of primary international obligations; it 
clarified and codified to a large extent the customary rules on attribution of conduct to 
States and international organizations; it successfully articulated a rule on the 																																																								
1 GA Res 174 (II) of 21 November 1947. The ILC was established by the UN General Assembly as 
a means to realize the Article 13 (1)(a) UN Charter: ‘1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies 
and make recommendations for the purpose of: (a) … encouraging the progressive development of 
international law and its codification”; see also Article 1(1) of the ILC Statute, adopted by GA Res 
174 (II). For the ILC generally and its contribution to the progressive development and codification 
of international law see R Higgins et al, Oppenheim’s International Law: United Nations (Oxford, 
OUP 2017) 929– 46 and 974–77 with further references; M Shaw, International Law (8th edn, 
CUP 2017) 89–90  and n 223 therein. 
2 J Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, 
Text and Commentaries (CUP 2002) 60. 
3 GA Res 56/83 of 12 December 2001, Annex; and Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, YBILC (2001), vol. II (Part 2), 31 
(‘ARSIWA commentary’). 
	 12	
responsibility of States in case of aid and assistance;4 it clarified circumstances under 
which wrongfulness is precluded;5 and it laid down situations of aggravated responsibility 
and their consequences, among others.6 The articles on the content of international 
responsibility, in particular on the obligation to make reparation as a consequence of an 
internationally wrongful act, also codified, in their greatest part, pre-existing customary 
international law and are articulated in –at least seemingly7– quite clear terms.8 According 
to the PCIJ’s Chorzów Factory judgment,9 the locus classicus on remedies in international 
law, as codified in Article 31 ARSIWA, every internationally wrongful act triggers the 
secondary obligation to make full reparation to the injured State for the injury caused. 
Reparation can take different forms10 depending on the damage caused and the type of 
internationally wrongful act committed, as long as it achieves ‘full reparation’.  
These successes notwithstanding, and as usual in such ambitious codification efforts, the 
need for compromise and for commonly accepted outcomes left ‘unanswered several 
important questions’.11 One of these questions, is the manner that the obligation to make 
reparation is allocated among multiple responsible actors: States, international 
organizations, multinational corporations, private individuals. In that respect, according to 
																																																								
4 See generally B Graefrath, ‘Complicity in the Law of International Responsibility’ (1996) RBDI 
371; V Lowe, ‘Responsibility for Conduct of Other States’ (2002) 101 Journal of International Law 
and Diplomacy 1; H Aust, Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility (CUP 2011) 192–268. 
5 For a discussion on the conceptual issues raised by the nature of circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness as ‘justifications’ or ‘excuses’ and their incorporation in the ARSIWA, see V Lowe, 
‘Precluding Wrongfulness or Responsibility: A Plea for Excuses’ (1999) 1 EJIL 405; generally F 
Paddeu, Justification and Excuse in International Law: Concept and Theory of General Defences 
(CUP 2018), and especially 129ff. 
6 R Rosenstock/M Kaplan, ‘The Fifty-Third Session of the International Law Commission’ (2002) 
96 AJIL 412. 
7 D Shelton, ‘Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles of State Responsibility’ (2002) 96 
American Journal of International Law 833. 
8 Cf however the first Report of the Special Rapporteur Garcia-Amador on International 
Responsibility, ‘State Responsibility’, UN Doc A/CN.4/96, (1956) II YBILC 172, 209: “[A]s one 
inquires into the content of that duty [to make reparation], or the nature and extent of reparation, 
problems and difficulties of an exceptional complexity are disclosed. In no other aspect of the law 
of international responsibility is there a greater number of uncertain points’. 
9 Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity), Jurisdiction, PCJI Series A, No 9, 1927, 4, at 21. 
10 See Article 34 ARSIWA. 
11 Shelton, ‘Righting Wrongs’ (n 7) 833. 
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d’Argent, the work of the ILC could even be considered as ‘deliberately inconclusive’.12 
The question the present dissertation will explore is exactly how the intricacies of the 
obligation to make reparation and of remedies in international law have shaped the 
approach of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and to a certain extent other 
international courts and tribunals towards the apportionment of damages among multiple 
responsible actors. 
Situations where damage may be caused by a plurality of responsible (or even not 
responsible) actors are not at all new in international law.13 For example, in the 1950s the 
question arose who bore international responsibility for the damage suffered by Swiss 
nationals in the international zone of Tangier.14 The Swiss Federal Political Council came 
to the conclusion that effective control over the zone of Tangier was jointly exercised by a 
Commission of Control composed by representatives of the States participating in the 
international administration of the territory, ie France, Spain, Great Britain, USA, the 
Soviet Union, the Netherlands, Portugal and Italy.15 As the Commission constituted their 
common organ, the States participating in it had responsibility for its actions.16 However, 
and given that the common body was composed by representatives of the various States, 
each State was considered to be responsible not for the entirety of the damage caused, but 
rather only for a part of it.17  
																																																								
12 D’Argent, ‘Cessation, Reparation, Assurances and Guarantees of Non-Repetition’ in A 
Nollkaemper/I Plakokefalos (eds), Principles of Shared Responsibility: An Appraisal of the State of 
the Art (CUP 2014) 208 –50. 
13 M Paparinskis, ‘Procedural Aspects of Shared Responsibility in the International Court of 
Justice’ (2013) 4 JIDS 295, 299. According to J Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part 
(CUP 2013) 325, ‘States rarely operate in isolation. There are many situation where they choose to 
act together to achieve a mutually beneficial outcome, and as many forms which such joint and 
collective action may take … Given how common interstate co-operation is, it is perhaps surprising 
that the law of responsibility in this area remains relatively undeveloped’. 
14 For a brief description of the status of the international zone of Tangier and its administration see 
C G Fenwick, ‘The International Status of Tangier’ (1929) 23 AJIL 140; P Guggenheim, ‘Droit 
International Public: Responsabilité internationale pour des dommages causés dans la zone de 
Tanger’ (1953) 10 Annuaire suisse de droit international 238, 241–43. 
15 ‘Responsabilité internationale pour des dommages causés dans la zone de Tanger’ (n 14) 242–
47.  
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid 247–48.  
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As explained in Chapter III, situations where a plurality of actors may cause and contribute 
to a single injury can be encountered in many different formulations. As will be shown, 
these can be broken down into two primary types.18 Although the ILC recognized the 
existence of such situations and the possibility of sharing responsibility in the ARSIWA 
(and the DARIO), it only briefly discussed the matters in the commentary. It left largely 
unanswered the question of how the obligation to make reparation shall be divided among 
a plurality of responsible actors and from whom the injured State may request reparation 
for the damage suffered. Scholarly authorities have argued that the principles governing 
such situations remain ‘indistinct’19 and have advocated for the existence (or the need) of a 
grand principle to address such situations, in the guise of ‘joint and several responsibility’ 
as found in domestic legal systems. As will be explained this principle is not completely 
unknown to international law. However, and although one may recognize the merits of 
such a general rule to regulate the allocation of the obligation to make reparation among 
multiple responsible actors, especially for victims’ justice, international jurisprudence 
hardly supports its existence and the rule does not presently constitute lex lata. 
Accuracy in the determination of liability and the assessment of harm is necessary both for 
the deterrence of unlawful behaviour and for potential responsible actors to take 
appropriate precautions when making their decisions.20 Additionally, and in light of the 
consent-based, bilateralised, and fragmented international dispute settlement system, 
understanding the principles governing such situations will clarify and highlight how rules 
on jurisdiction and admissibility apply in such situations as well as their necessary 
ramifications.21 
																																																								
18 Crawford, State Responsibility (n 13) 333 discussing the different typologies of ‘joint and 
collective state conduct’ highlights that ‘in practice the differences may not be clear-cut, and 
various forms of collaborative conduct can co-exist in the same case’. 
19 Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, OUP 2012) 554. 
20 L Kaplow/S Shavell, ‘Accuracy in the Determination of Liability’ (1994) 37 Journal of Law and 
Economics 1; L Kaplow/S Shavell, ‘Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages’ (1996) 39 Journal of 
Law and Economics 191. 
21 See for the procedural difficulties arising in the context of cases of shared responsibility the 
collection of essays in the Journal of International Dispute Settlement 4 (2013) with contributions 
by Nollkaemper, Plakokefalos, Palchetti, Paparinskis, and van Heijer. 
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Chapters IV and V will then explore how the ICJ has navigated the unclear waters of 
remedies and situations of shared responsibility. In a recent case on compensation, the 
Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area,22  it was recognized that  
[t]he damage may be due to several concurrent causes, or the state of science 
regarding the causal link between the wrongful act and the damage may be 
uncertain. These are difficulties that must be addressed as and when they arise in 
the light of the facts of the case at hand and the evidence presented to the Court.23  
Hence, the Court seems mindful of the possibility that more than one causes, indeed more 
than one responsible actors, may contribute to the injury suffered by a State, as has been 
the case with other disputes brought before it in the past. As the analysis will demonstrate, 
dealing with such situations the Court has resisted articulating some grand principle on 
how apportionment of damages against multiple responsible States is to be performed. It 
has rather treated each case within the framework and limitations of the jurisdictional title 
at hand and in light of first principles of international responsibility. These include the 
principle of independent responsibility, ‘full reparation’ and the existence of the necessary 
causal link between the internationally wrongful act(s) and the damage suffered. The 
Court’s attitude in these cases is consistent with its more general practice of displaying 
flexibility in the determination of remedies and is affirmed by the practice of other 
international courts and tribunals. 
The final part of this dissertation, Chapter VI, will then conclude summarizing the main 
conclusions of this study, offering explanations and suggestions on the possible takeaways. 
It has to be stated at the outset that the present thesis is not intended to oppose the 
argument that it is normatively desirable for international law to have an overarching rule 
on how the obligation to make reparation is allocated among multiple responsible actors. 
																																																								
22 For a commentary see D Desierto, ‘Environmental Damages, Environmental Reparations, and 
the Right to a Healthy Environment: The ICJ Compensation Judgment in Costa Rica v. Nicaragua 
and the IACtHR Advisory Opinion on Marine Protection for the Great Caribbean’, EJIL:Talk!, 14 
February 2018, available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/environmental-damages-environmental-
reparations-and-the-right-to-a-healthy-environment-the-icj-compensation-judgment-in-costa-rica-
v-nicaragua-and-the-iacthr-advisory-opinion-on-marine-protection/. 
23 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) 
Compensation, Judgment of 2 February 2018, para 34. 
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Nor is it supposed to reject the principle of joint and several responsibility pursuant to what 
Hersch Lauterpacht described as  
a custom with publicists writing on certain disputed questions of international law 
to base their argument on the assertion that the opinion with which they happen to 
disagree is nothing else than a misleading analogy to a conception of private law.24  
The main argument advanced herein is that remedies is a field in which international courts 
and tribunals tend to maintain flexibility and take a case-specific approach. This tactic is 
fundamentally not conducive to the articulation of any grand principle on the allocation of 
the obligation to make reparation among multiple responsible actors. Additionally, the 
principle of consent and the particularities of each specific jurisdictional setting will 
essentially limit the power to engage in discussions that may implicate third parties 
extraneous to the proceedings at hand. As will be shown, the ICJ and to a certain extent 
other international courts and tribunals have rather found different ways to deal with such 
situations when presented to them. These include primarily a resort to first principles of 
international responsibility and a thorough look into the primary obligations at stake. 
Before beginning the analysis, it is necessary to set out the methodology employed in the 
present dissertation and recognize its limitations. The subject-matter is analysed through 
the lens of an internal, doctrinal approach in which the applicable rules of international law 
and first principles play a central role. Additionally, a comparative study of a selection of 
cases from international court and tribunals that have dealt with the issue of reparation 
when multiple actors are involved has been conducted. It has to be conceded at the outset 
that due to time and space constraints the cases examined here are only a selection from 
the case-law. The thesis has made the ICJ the primary focus of inquiry and refers to 
decisions of other international courts and tribunals to the extent that they affirm or 
contradict the approach taken by the Court. The selection of cases examined has been 
based on the author’s view that they are representative of the problématique underlying the 
present dissertation and help illustrate its overarching argument. Finally, an important 
clarification in delimiting the subject matter of this study has to be made. Situations 
involving multiple responsible actors causing a single injury are multifaceted and may 
involve actors of a very different nature. The present dissertation grapples with the topic 
from the perspective of responsible States rather than States and international organizations 
or non-state, private actors. The issues arising from situations involving such other actors 
																																																								
24 H Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (Longmans 1927) vii. 
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have informed the research of course and feature at the background of this study and are 
referred to whenever necessary. 
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II. State responsibility and the obligation to make reparation 
1. The genesis of the obligation to make reparation and its remedial function  
a. The obligation to make reparation as a consequence of an internationally wrongful 
act 
Under general international law,25 when a State commits an internationally wrongful act—
an act or omission that is attributable to her and simultaneously constitutes a violation of 
her international obligations26—her international responsibility is engaged.27 This may be 
considered a general principle of international law, even an ‘axiomatic’ one.28 
In his seminal study on State Responsibility, Brownlie asserts:29 
																																																								
25 The rules on international responsibility surveyed in this dissertation are those under general 
international law that operate as the default option when a State (or another international actor) 
violates her international obligations. Nothing prevents States from agreeing to special rules to 
apply in the relations between them under a particular treaty regime, or even through the 
emergence of regional custom (at least in principle, although see for the difficulties concerning the 
emergence of a regional custom Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v India) Merits 
[1960] ICJ Rep 6). See also ARSIWA Article 55, and generally Simma/Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and 
the University: Self-contained Regimes in International Law’ (2006) 17 EJIL 483.  
26 ARSIWA Article 2; see also DARIO Article 4 for an international wrongful act by an 
international organization. 
27 See Phosphates in Morocco, Preliminary Objections, PCIJ Series A/B No 74, 1938, 10, 28:  
It is in this decision that we should look for the violation of international law—a definitive 
act which would, by itself, directly, involve international responsibility. This act being 
attributable to the State and described as contrary to the treaty right of another State, 
international responsibility would be established immediately between the two States.  
See also ARSIWA Article 1; B Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International 
Courts and Tribunals (CUP 1953, 2006) 170. The same holds true for international organizations 
and the violation of their international obligations, see: DARIO Article 3. 
28 J Crawford, ‘State Responsibility’ in MPEPIL, MN 17. 
29 I Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility, Part I  (Clarendon Press 1983) 1–
2. On the origins of international responsibility generally and state responsibility in particular see 
ibid 2–9; also, Y Matsui, ‘The Transformation of the Law of State Responsibility’ in R Provost 
(ed), State Responsibility in International Law (Routledge 2002) 3–63. 
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the concept of responsibility is both very simple and yet sophisticated. It is both a 
fundamental moral idea common to laymen and lawyers, and a concept which in 
legal experience calls for considerable study and refinement, involving nice 
problems of measure of damages, liability for moral damage and so forth. 
The content of a State’s international responsibility consists of the genesis of ‘a new legal 
relationship’30 between the responsible State and the injured State. This new legal 
relationship gives rise to another set of obligations, also often referred to as ‘secondary 
obligations’,31 which aim to restore legality and remedy the injury suffered. This new set 
of obligations consists, first, of an obligation of cessation of the internationally wrongful 
act (if it is a continuing one) and the provision of assurances and guarantees of non-
repetition,32 and, second, of an obligation to make reparation for the injury caused.33 
Reparation can then take different forms, namely restitution, compensation, or satisfaction, 
either singly or in combination.34 
According to the often-quoted dictum of the PCIJ in the Chorzow Factory case:35  
																																																								
30 Cf L Reitzer, La Réparation comme Conséquence de l’Acte illicite en Droit international (Sirey 
1938) 25, who speaks of ‘une obligation nouvelle: celle de réparer le tort’ and his n 2. Also, J 
Combacau/D Alland, ‘“Primary” and “Secondary” Rules in the Law of State Responsibility: 
Categorizing International Obligations’ (1985) 16 NYIL 81, 85; B Stern, ‘The Obligation to Make 
Reparation’ in J Crawford et al (eds), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP 2010) 563–70, 
563.  
31 See ARSIWA Article 28 with commentaries; DARIO Article 28 with commentaries; Reitzer (n 
30) 26; d’Argent, Reparation (n 12) 208. The term ‘secondary obligations’ is not meant to diminish 
the importance of the consequences of international responsibility, to the contrary these are indeed 
fundamental (cf Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v DRC) Compensation, Judgment, Dis 
Op Cancado Trinidade [2012] ICJ Rep 347, paras 32–40), as the PCIJ had already recognised in 
the Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity), PCJI Series A/09, 1927, Jurisdiction, 4, 21. 
32 ARSIWA Article 30. 
33 ARSIWA Article 31. Cf Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v 
Nicaragua) Judgment [2009] ICJ Rep 213, 267, para 149, where the Court characterized cessation 
as ‘a form of reparation for the injured State’. 
34 See ARSIWA Articles 34–37 (and DARIO Articles 34–37). For an analysis of the various forms 
see Stern, ‘The Obligation to Make Reparation’ in Crawford et al (n 30); C Gray, ‘The Choice 
Between Restitution and Compensation’ (1999) EJIL 413. 
35 Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity), Jurisdiction, PCJI Series A, No 9, 1927, 4, 21 
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It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an 
obligation to make reparation in an adequate form. Reparation therefore is the 
indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is no 
necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself. 
So central is the duty to make reparation that in much of the early scholarship on the 
subject the content of international responsibility seems to have been virtually equated 
with the obligation to make reparation.36 Eagleton in his early study of international 
responsibility characteristically starts the first chapter as follows:37 
The study of the responsibility of states in international law involves an 
examination of the theory upon which reparation may be demanded by one state of 
another, and of the processes by which it may be obtained… The failure to meet 
[international] obligations imposes upon the guilty state the further obligation to 
make reparation for the injury caused; and, in practice, states are every day called 
upon for such reparation. 
For his part, Reitzer in 1938 in his study of reparation as a consequence of an 
internationally wrongful act argued: 
La doctrine and la pratique du droit des gens affirment à peu près unanimement que 
tout acte illicite entraîne à la charge de son auteur un devoir de réparation.38 
The obligation to make reparation being the necessary corollary of the violation of an 
international obligation is automatically triggered by the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act; it occurs ‘as a matter of law’ and it does not require the injured party to 
present a claim against or invoke the responsibility of the responsible State.39 
Complementing this ‘substantive corollary’ are the obligations of cessation and non-
repetition of the internationally wrongful act.40 Literature has paid less attention to these 																																																								
36 See ILC, ‘State Responsibility’, Report of the Special Rapporteur Garcia Amador, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/96, 209; also B Stern, ‘The Elements of An Internationally Wrongful Act’ in Crawford et 
al (n 30), 193–218, 194. 
37 C Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law (NYU Press 1928) 3. 
38 Reitzer (n 30) 25.  
39 ARSIWA commentary, 91, para 4; Crawford, State Responsibility (n 13) 95. 
40 Cf Gray, ‘Remedies’ in Romano et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication 
(OUP 2013) 871–98, 879. According to the Court in Dispute regarding Navigational and Related 
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consequences of international responsibility than to the obligation to make reparation, but 
in everyday international practice they will often be of bigger importance to States.41 
Crawford refers by way of example to the multilateral trade system established under the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and its dispute settlement mechanism.42 In that context, 
a State that has violated its obligations under the WTO Agreements is primarily obligated 
to cease the violation, and more specifically to bring the measure found in breach of WTO 
law in conformity with the covered agreements. Under the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU)43 compensation and suspension of concessions have a limited role to 
play compared to cessation of the breach and full implementation of the covered 
agreements which are the preferred remedies.44  
b. Reparation as a remedy 
The duty to provide reparation is not only a consequence of an internationally wrongful act 
but also essentially a remedy afforded to the injured party for the damage suffered as a 
result of an international law violation.45 According to the Umpire in the Lusitania Cases 
‘it is a general rule … that for every such injury the law gives a remedy … commensurate 
with the injury received. It is variously expressed as “compensation”, “reparation”, 
“indemnity” … and is measured by pecuniary standards, because, says Grotius, “money is 																																																								
Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) Judgment [2009] ICJ Rep 213, 267, para 148 ‘the obligation 
incumbent on the State concerned to cease such conduct [of a wrongful nature] derives by 
operation from the very fact that the Court establishes the existence of a violation of a continuing 
character’; For the terminology ‘substantive corollary’ and ‘procedural corollary’ of an 
internationally wrongful act, see Crawford, State Responsibility (n 13) 95. The ‘procedural 
corollaries’ of international responsibility are the invocation of responsibility and the presentation 
of a claim on behalf of the injured party, as well as the taking of countermeasures, see Crawford, 
ibid. 
41 See Graefrath, ‘Responsibility and Damages Caused: Relationship Between Responsibility and 
Damages’ (1985) 185 Recueil des Cours 9–149, 73; Crawford, ‘State Responsibility’ (n 28) MN 
23; cf Gray, ‘Remedies’ (n 40) 880. Cf the treatment of cessation and guarantees and assurances of 
non-repetition by the ICJ in LaGrand (Germany v USA) Judgment [2001] ICJ Rep 466, 512–14, 
paras 123–25.  
42 Crawford, ‘State Responsibility’ (n 28) MN 23. 
43 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (15 April 1994) 1867 UNTS 3, Annex 2, 
1867 UNTS 154. 
44 Articles 3.7, 19, 21 and 22 DSU. See also C Brown, A Common Law of International 
Adjudication (OUP 2007) 218–20. 
45 Brown (n 44) 186. 
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the common measure of valuable things”’.46 In contemporary international law it is 
generally accepted that ‘remedy’ is a term somewhat broader than ‘reparation’47 as it may 
encompass other means of remedying the breach, such as assurances and guarantees of 
non-repetition. In turn, ‘reparation’ is an umbrella term and as mentioned above may take 
three different forms: restitution, compensation, and satisfaction. ‘Compensation’ is often 
used interchangeably with ‘damages’ to denote the monetary awards granted to make good 
the damage suffered.  
Notwithstanding that the obligation to make reparation accrues in an automatic way, it will 
practically require for its realization the invocation of the responsibility of the author of the 
internationally wrongful act and the presentation of a claim.48 In the decentralized system 
of international law these actions will usually take place through diplomatic channels and 
negotiations.49 But they might also often involve a third party, especially if the situation 
has culminated into a dispute between the parties involved.50 This third party may assist 
the disputing parties either in a non-binding manner, ie by facilitating their negotiations, by 
																																																								
46 Lusitania Cases, 1 November 1923, RIAA, vol VII, 32–44, 35. 
47 L Marotti/P Palchetti, ‘Of Restoring Compliance, Lex Specialis and Intersecting Wrongs: The 
Question of “Remedies” in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros’ in S Forlati/M Mbengue (eds), The Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros Judgment and its Contribution to the Development of International Law (Brill/Nijhoff, 
forthcoming), 1 (provisional page).  
48 A Vermeer-Kunzli, ‘Invocation of Responsibility’ in A Nollkaemper/I Plakokefalos (n 12) 251–
83, 252. 
49 For a discussion of negotiations as a means of dispute settlement in the context of remedies, see 
D Anderson, ‘Negotiation and Dispute Settlement’ in M Evans (ed), Remedies in International 
Law: The Institutional Dilemma (Hart 1994) 111–21. 
50 The most often quoted definition of an international dispute is the following passage from the 
The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, PCIJ, Series A, No 2, 6, at 11: ‘A dispute is a 
disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two 
persons.’ Of course, if the injured State invokes the responsibility of the author of the 
internationally wrongful act and claims reparation for the damage suffered, and the latter accepts 
such responsibility and offers reparation then there would be no dispute between the parties to be 
resolved by a third party. Cf Graefrath, ‘Responsibility and damages caused’ (n 41) 91. 
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mediating or offering their good offices and so forth,51 or may involve binding dispute 
resolution, through arbitration or judicial settlement. As Shaw observes:52  
A finding that a rule of international law has been breached by a particular party 
constitutes the indispensable first stage in a remedial action; to put it another way, a 
remedy is contingent upon the determination and definition of responsibility, which 
in turn relies upon an earlier decision as to the existence of a breach of international 
law. 
Arbitral and judicial institutions are indeed quite instrumental to the realization of the 
obligation to make reparation. This is evident, among other things, from the practice to 
establish tribunals or commissions to deal with the aftermath of crises of an international 
character or when a large number of claims for damages need to be dealt with. Examples 
of this practice are the Mixed Claims Commissions established at the start of the 20th 
century, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, as well as the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission. 
Apart from that, arbitral and judicial institutions have also had big influence in the 
crystallization of many of the fundamental principles that operate in the realm of 
international responsibility, reparation and damages.53 According to Graefrath the Chorzów 
Factory dictum has been repeated ‘in every single piece of legal scholarship on the 
topic’.54  
However, despite the cardinal role ascribed to the Chorzów Factory principle in legal 
scholarship, and its almost ‘ritual incantation’55 in the relevant decisions of international 
courts and tribunals, the field of remedies in general international law has been to a certain 
extent overlooked.56 In recent years, there have been few more detailed studies on 
remedies within specialized systems of international law, such as human rights or 																																																								
51 For a comment on these ‘softer’ means of dispute settlement see C Chinkin, ‘Alternative Dispute 
Resolution under International Law’ in Evans (n 49) 122–40. 
52 M Shaw, ‘The International Court, Remedies and Responsibility’ in M Fitzmaurice/D Sarooshi 
(eds), Issues of State Responsibility before International Judicial Institutions (Hart 2004) 19–33, 
19.  
53 Brown (n 44) 185. 
54 Graefrath, ‘Responsibility and damages caused’ (n 41) 69. 
55 This phrase in international legal scholarship was used first by C Gray in International Law and 
the Use of Force (4th edn, OUP 2018) 125. 
56 C Gray, Judicial Remedies in International Law (Clarendon Press 1987) 1; Shaw, ‘The 
International Court, Remedies and Responsibility’ (n 52) 20; Gray, ‘Remedies’ (n 40) 872. 
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international investment law.57 But not on the rules and principles applicable to remedies 
under general international law.58 
Concluding a recent assessment of the topic of remedies before various international courts 
and tribunals, Gray has asserted that ‘[t]he diversity of tribunals is clearly reflected in the 
diversity of their practice on remedies.’59 Thus, according to her analysis even though the 
Chorzów Factory principle is considered generally applicable and as reflecting a general 
principle of international law, it is usually adjusted in the circumstances of each particular 
judicial setting and in the subject-matter of the particular case in question.60 
The foregoing analysis illustrates the following points. First, the issue of remedies is 
generally underexplored in international law and international courts and tribunals seem to 
have quite diverse approaches when it comes to it. This will necessarily affect any effort to 
articulate a general rule concerning the allocation of the obligation to make reparation 
among multiple actors that have all contributed to the same damage, at least one that would 
be of use in different judicial settings. Therefore, when searching for a grand principle fit 
to deal with situations of shared responsibility one needs to conduct her research having 
this general context in mind. Additionally, the jurisprudence of international courts and 
tribunals on remedies and in general has been instrumental in the development of the law 
of international responsibility, as well as in crystallizing the consequences of an 
internationally wrongful act. Hence, it is necessary to conduct any discussion on the 
principles applicable to the allocation of the obligation to make reparation among multiple 
responsible actors with international judicial institutions in mind. As the analysis in 
Chapters IV and V will illustrate the ICJ and to a certain extent other international court 
																																																								
57 See, for example, D Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (3rd edn, OUP 
2015); D Desierto, ‘The Outer Limits of Adequate Reparations for Breaches of Non-Expropriation 
Investment Treaty Provisions: Choice and Proportionality in Chorzow’ (2017) 55 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 395. 
58 But see for short studies Gray, ‘Remedies’ (n 40); Brown (n 44) 185–224; Shelton, ‘Righting 
Wrongs’ (n 7). See also I Brownlie, ‘Remedies in the International Court of Justice’ in V Lowe/M 
Fitzmaurice (eds), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice (CUP 1996) 557; as well as M 
Evans (ed), Remedies in International Law: The Institutional Dilemma (Hart 1998); and a very 
recent thesis conducted in the University of Geneva, V S Stoica, Remedies Before the International 
Court of Justice: A Systemic Analysis, Université de Genève (2018), available at https://archive-
ouverte.unige.ch/unige:104150. 
59 Gray, ‘Remedies’ (n 40) 896. 
60 Ibid. 
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and tribunals have already dealt with such situations one way or another. Their practice in 
doing so constitutes then a useful guiding principle on how we should be thinking about 
the subject. Moreover, given the proliferation of international adjudicatory bodies as well 
as the increasing regularity with which cases involving multiple responsible actors appear 
before them, any general rule on the allocation of the obligation to make reparation would 
need to be workable in the context of international dispute settlement.  
The next section will turn to the issue of damage and the conceptual and practical 
difficulties surrounding it, to explore how this might affect an inquiry on how the 
obligation to make reparation should be allocated among multiple responsible actors. 
2. The question of damage 
The place of damage in the law of international responsibility had been extensively 
discussed in the early scholarship on the topic and the early years of the work of the ILC 
on the matter. Naturally, as at the time State responsibility was mostly viewed in relation to 
the injuries sustained by aliens in a foreign State’s territory, damage played a central role 
in such a conception of responsibility. A conscious choice of the ILC during the long-
lasting preparation of the ARSIWA, however, was to disentangle the engagement of 
international responsibility from the occurrence of damage. Ago initiated this shift towards 
a concept of international responsibility that would occur irrespective of whether the 
violation of the international obligation in question had caused damage to the affected 
state, when he succeeded Garcia-Amador as Special Rapporteur.61 This marked a change 
in perception with regard to the function of international responsibility itself.62  It signified 
a move from a private, civil law approach to responsibility—with the sole purpose of 
providing indemnification for the damage suffered—to a more international public law 
idea of responsibility as a means of reinstating the stability and integrity of the 
international legal order disturbed by the breach.63  
																																																								
61 Graefrath, ‘Responsibility and damages caused’ (n 41) 34 and n 41, and 36, 63. 
62 Graefrath, ‘Responsibility and damages caused’ (n 41) 24–25, 32–33, 36. 
63 See generally ibid 19–33, 36, for a detailed account of this progress from a civil law concept of 
responsibility entirely focused on the provision of reparation to the victim of the violation to a 
more ‘international’ public law concept of responsibility: Stern, ‘The Elements of an 
Internationally Wrongful Act’ (n 36) 194–95; see also ARSIWA with commentaries, 87, para 1, 
stating ‘the rules and institutions of State responsibility are significant for the maintenance of 
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Ultimately, damage was considered to be an issue falling within the realm of the primary 
rules of international law, as was the case with fault.64 As such, it may be that the primary 
obligation incumbent upon the responsible State requires that no harm to another State is 
caused.65 In this case, the State will have violated its international obligation only if 
damage in one form or another has been actually suffered by the affected State. But it may 
also be that what the State’s international obligations require is for it to adopt a certain 
conduct66 or legislation in its domestic legal order to give effect to its international 
obligations.67 In this latter case, the State would violate its international obligations 
through mere non-performance with no need for actual damage to be sustained by another 
party; its international responsibility would arise independently from it. Implicit in this 
																																																								
respect for international law and for the achievement of the goals which States advance through 
law-making at the international level’.   
64 See ARSIWA with commentaries, 36, paras 9-10, and 92, para 6; Crawford, State Responsibility 
(n 13) 58–61; For the concept of fault see R Provost (ed), State Responsibility in International Law 
(Routledge 2002) 3–4; I Brownlie, ‘State Responsibility and the International Court of Justice’ in 
Fitzmaurice/ Sarooshi (n 52) 11–18, 12; also, for an early account see Lauterpacht, Private Sources 
(n 24) 134–43. 
65 Article 31 ARSIWA with commentaries, 92, para 6; Crawford, State Responsibility (n 13) 57. 
66 For the distinction between obligations of conduct and obligations of result, see Jean Combacau, 
‘Obligations de résultat et obligations de comportement: Quelques questions et pas de réponse’ in 
Mélanges offerts à Paul Reuter—Le droit international: Unité et diversité (Pedone 1981) 181–204. 
See, also, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) Merits, Judgment [2007] ICJ Rep 
43, 221, para 430; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) Judgment [2010] ICJ 
Rep 14, 77, para 187; Cf Responsibilities and Obligations of States with Respect to Activities in the 
Area, Advisory Opinion [2011] ITLOS Rep 10, 41, para 110:  
The sponsoring State’s obligation ‘to ensure’ is not an obligation to achieve, in each and 
every case, the result that the sponsored contractor complies with the aforementioned 
obligations. Rather, it is an obligation to deploy adequate means, to exercise best possible 
efforts, to do the utmost, to obtain this result. To utilize the terminology current in 
international law, this obligations may be characterized as an obligation ‘of conduct’ and 
not ‘of result’, and as an obligation of ‘due diligence’. 
67 See Article 2 ARSIWA with commentaries, 36, para 9 and n 73 therein; Article 31 ARSIWA 
with commentaries, 92, para 6; Crawford, State Responsibility (n 13) 57. This has been 
increasingly the case with the so-called ‘inward-looking’ norms of international law, see ILA, 
‘Mapping the Engagement of Domestic Courts with International Law’, Final Report of the Study 
Group on the Principles of the Engagement of Domestic Courts with International Law 
(Johannesburg 2016), para 12.  
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conceptualisation is the theoretical distinction between the concept of injury which is the 
result of ‘any violation of a right’ and that of ‘consequential harm’ that may be caused by 
such violation which is captured by the concept of damage.68 
For the obligation to make reparation to arise however the internationally wrongful act has 
to have caused an injury,69 which is defined in Article 31(2) ARSIWA in a ‘broad and 
inclusive way, leaving it to the primary obligations to specify what is required in each 
case’.70 Under Article 31(2) ‘[i]njury includes any damage, whether material or moral, 
caused by the internationally wrongful act of a State’. The commentary then defines 
‘damage’ as ‘material or moral loss or detriment suffered by a State in general, as an 
impairment of property or goods or the dignity or honour of the State, which can be either 
direct or indirect, suffered though the State’s nationals’.71 Material damage is any damage 
inflicted upon another State that is financially assessable,72 whereas moral damage is any 
other ‘individual pain and suffering, loss of loved ones or personal affront associated with 
an intrusion on one’s home or private life’.73  
International practice and jurisprudence does in fact affirm such a broad reading of the 
concept of injury. In particular, ‘moral’ or ‘non-material’ damage has regularly been the 
object of the obligation of a State to make reparation. Very early on, the Umpire in the 
Lusitania Cases proclaimed that it could not be doubted ‘[t]hat one injured is, under the 
rules of international law, entitled to be compensated for an injury inflicted resulting in 
mental suffering, injury to his feelings, humiliation, shame, degradation, loss of social 
																																																								
68 Graefrath, ‘Responsibility and damages caused’ (n 41) 35; ARSIWA commentary, 92, para 7. 
See also generally Stern, ‘The Elements of an Internationally Wrongful Act’ (n 36) 193. 
69 Article 31(1) ARSIWA; D’Argent (n 12) 209, 220. 
70 Article 31 ARSIWA with commentaries, 92, para 8; Crawford, ‘State Responsibility’ (n 28) MN 
27; See also Crawford, State Responsibility (n 30) 65, discussing the usefulness of the distinction 
between primary and secondary rules adopted in ARSIWA and asserting that ‘[i]t is only necessary 
for the ARSIWA to be drafted in such a way as to allow for the various possibilities [with respect 
to the element of damage]’ as provided for in the respective primary rules. 
71 ARSIWA with commentaries Article 31(2) and 91-92, para 5; See also DARIO with 
commentaries Article 31(2) and 56, para 2; See also Graefrath, ‘Responsibility and damages 
caused’ (n 41) 20.  
72 See also Article 34(2), which defines damage for which compensation may be due as any 
‘financially assessable damage including loss of profit insofar as it is established’. 
73 ARSIWA with commentaries, 92, para 5. 
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position or injury to his credit or to his reputation’.74 This was later confirmed by the ICJ 
in the Diallo case, where the Court recognized that ‘“[m]ental and moral damage” … or 
“non-pecuniary inury” … covers harm other than material injury which is suffered by an 
injured entity or individual. Non-material injury to a person which is cognizable under 
international law may take various forms’.75 To support its conclusion and because its 
case-law is rather scarce when it comes to awarding damages, the Court turned to the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The latter,76 as well as the 
European Court of Human Rights77 and the European Court of Justice,78 very regularly 
award compensation to victims of human rights violations for moral or non-material 
damage.79  
‘Moral’ or ‘non-material damage’ is also relevant in cases other than those involving rights 
of individuals. In fact, the commentary to ARSIWA Article 31 refers in that respect to the 
Rainbow Warrior arbitration.80 In Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand v France), the arbitral 
tribunal concluded that France’s actions  
provoked indignation and public outrage in New Zealand and caused a new, 
additional non-material damage… of a moral, political, and legal nature resulting 
																																																								
74 Lusitania cases (USA v Germany), 1 November 1923, VII RIAA 32, 40. 
75 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v DRC) Compensation, Judgment [2012] ICJ Rep 324, para 18. 
See, also, generally S Wittich, ‘Non-Material Damage and Monetary Reparation in International 
Law’ (2004) 15 FinnYIL 321. 
76 See, for example, IACtHR, Guttieréz-Soler v Colombia, Series C, No 132, 2005; IACtHR, Case 
of “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al) v Guatemala, Series C, No 77, 2001. 
77 See, for example, König v Germany (Article 50), App no 6232/73, Just Satisfaction, Judgment of 
10 March 1980, Series A No 36, para 19; Artico v Italy, App no 6494/74, Just Satisfaction, 
Judgment of 13 May 1980, Series A No 37, para 47; Young, James and Webster v UK (Article 50), 
App nos 7601/76 and 7806/77, Just Satisfaction, Judgment of 18 October 1982, Series A No 44, 
paras 12–13; Loizidou v Turkey (Article 50), App no 40/1993/435/514, Just Satisfaction, Judgment 
of 28 July 1998, Series A No 310, para 39. 
78 Joined cases C-7/56 and 3-7/57, Algera et al v Common Assembly of the European Coal and 
Steel Community, ECLI:EU:C:1957:7, Judgment of 12 July 1957, 66–67; Joined cases C-169/83 
and 36/84, Leussink et al v Commission of the European Communities, ECLI:EU:C:1986:371, 
Judgment of 8 October 1986, [1986] ECR 2801, 2827–28. 
79 Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (n 57) 278–79, 346–54. 
80 Article 31 ARSIWA with commentaries, 92, para 7. 
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from the affront to the dignity, and prestige not only of New Zealand as such, but 
of its highest judicial and executive authorities as well.81  
The aforementioned notwithstanding, such matters as whether damage has actually 
occurred and whether it has been material or moral will essentially affect the quantum and 
mode of reparation. These are complicated matters that have not been studied thoroughly 
in international law.82 During the work of the ILC on the topic, Special Rapporteur 
Crawford asserted that ‘the wide variety of factual situations, the influence of particular 
primary obligations, evaluations of the respective behaviour of the parties (both in terms of 
gravity of the breach and their subsequent conduct)’ made it difficult to articulate further 
rules regulating the assessment of compensation.83 The same would be equally true for any 
general rule aiming to regulate the allocation of the obligation to make reparation among 
multiple responsible actors. In view of the fact that damage is left to be determined in each 
specific case, depending on the requirements of the primary obligation that has been 
violated, a rule on the allocation of the obligation to make reparation for such damage in 
abstracto would be hardly helpful, at least in practice. Different actors are bound by 
different obligations, which in turn may well have different requirements concerning the 
occurrence of damage or otherwise, in order for them to be breached. In this complex, 
factual and rule-specific setting, such a grand principle does not seem to make much sense 
and would most probably fail to capture (and consequently accommodate) all possible 
situations. 
A final crucial point to be addressed here is the problem of causation or the necessary 
causal link. Causation is interconnected with damage, as in order for any damage to 
become the object of reparation ‘it has to be proven that such damage was the result of the 
																																																								
81 Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand v France), 30 April 1990, XX RIAA 215, 266–67, paras 107–
110. 
82 From the very few scholarly works on these matters see: I Marboe, Calculation of Compensation 
and Damages in International Investment Law (2nd edn, OUP 2017); Desierto (n 57). 
83 ILC, Third Report on State Responsibility by Mr James Crawford, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/507 and Add 1–4 (2000), at 51, para 159 (references omitted) (‘Third Report Crawford’). 
See also Graefrath, ‘Responsibility and damages caused’ (n 41) 94 and n 233 therein for further 
references. 
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violation’.84 The ILC has been ‘particularly silent’ on the issue of causation.85 The latter is 
however implicit in the wording of Article 31 ARSIWA (and Article 31 DARIO), where it 
is stated that the responsible State has to make reparation for the damage ‘caused’ by its 
internationally wrongful act; the damage thus needs to be causally connected to the 
internationally wrongful act of the State and not be due to another cause.  
Despite its apparent central place in the law of international responsibility, in particular 
with regard to the obligation to make reparation, causation as a concept is rather 
underexplored in international law; international courts and tribunals have generally 
‘dodged’ such questions, approaching the issue when it arises in cases before them in an 
unclear and at times ad hoc manner, whereas international legal scholarship has never paid 
too much attention to it either.86  
Causation is the process of connecting an act or omission to an outcome as a cause and 
effect.87 In the words of the ILC, reparation is due for ‘injury resulting from and ascribable 
to the wrongful act, rather than any and all consequences flowing from an internationally 
wrongful act’.88 Explaining what causation in law means, the ILC maintained that ‘[t]he 
allocation of injury or loss to a wrongful act is, in principle, a legal and not only a 
historical or causal process’ and that in certain cases injuries that are ‘too remote’ or 
‘consequential’ are excluded from the obligation to provide reparation.89  In a more clear-
cut manner, Plakokefalos argues that causation should be constructed as a two-step 
process; that of factual causation and that of scope of responsibility.90 
																																																								
84 Graefrath, ‘Responsibility and damages caused’ (n 41) 35; D’Argent (n 12) 220, according to 
whom ‘causality triggers the obligation to make reparation regarding certain harms, i.e. those that 
can be said to be the result of the breach’. 
85 Stern, ‘The Obligation to Make Reparation’ (n 34) 569. 
86 For a recent exploration of causation in international law see I Plakokefalos, ‘Causation in the 
Law of State Responsibility and the Problem of Overdetermination: In Search of Clarity’ (2015) 26 
EJIL 471.  
87 Ibid 472. 
88 ARSIWA commentary, 92, para 9. 
89 Ibid para 10. 
90 See generally Plakokefalos (n 86). D Hamer, ‘“Factual causation” and “scope of liability”: 
What’s the Difference?’ (2014) 77 MLR 155, argues that ‘[f]actual causation is determined through 
a purely factual enquire whereas scope of liability is non-causal and involves a normative 
assessment.’ Hamer argues (ibid generally) that although the distinction between the two concepts 
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In the realm of reparation, causation is significant not only because it allows us to find 
which injury is reparable, but also because it indicates who is the subject liable to make 
reparation.91 Its importance is further revealed, when in the event of a plurality of 
responsible actors one attempts to allocate the obligation to make reparation amongst 
them.92 According to d’Argent, causality is crucial for the obligation to make reparation 
also because it determines ‘the allocation of its performance, since it is on the basis of 
causality that, notably, apportionment is decided’.93 This might seem quite straightforward 
but it immediately triggers two concerns. First, if it is true that international courts and 
tribunals approach causality in an unprincipled and ad hoc, case-specific manner, then it 
would be next to impossible to develop any general rule on the allocation of the obligation 
to make reparation that would apply in all situation that a plurality of responsible actors 
exists. Second, when it is not possible to causally divide the injury and perform 
apportionment of the damage on a causal basis, who amongst the multiple responsible 
actors and to what extent bears the obligation to make reparation to the injured party? 
Interim Conclusions 
The obligation to make reparation is a central feature of the law of international 
responsibility. It is both a consequence of the internationally wrongful act and a remedy to 
its victim for the injury suffered. As straightforward as it may be however that ‘the breach 
of an international engagement entails an obligation to make reparation’ there are a lot of 
unclear points in that respect. For one, the obligation to make reparation depends very 
much upon the occurrence of damage. Issues such as the form of the damage and its extent 
have great influence on the appropriate form of reparation. Second, causality seems to play 
																																																								
has had value in promoting clarity and conceptual understanding of the intricacies of causation its 
sharpness has been overstated. 
91 Cf J D Fry, ‘Attribution of Responsibility’ in Nollkaemper/Plakokefalos (eds), Principles of 
Shared Responsibility (n 12) 98–133, 101, where he briefly refers to the debate of whether 
attribution of an act to the state has to be performed by law rather than causality (or the opposite) is 
the proper test. As Fry correctly concludes attribution means ‘a probe into the question of “who did 
it”’. Thus, attribution merely aims at identifying the state or international organization to which the 
internationally wrongful act is ‘attached’ for responsibility purposes but it ‘says nothing about 
whether responsibility should actually attach [sic] or not’ (ibid 101). 
92 For the articulation of this same concern see A Nollkaemper/I Plakokefalos, ‘Conclusions: 
Beyond the ILC Legacy’ in A Nollkaemper/I Plakokefalos, Principles of Shared Responsibility (n 
12), 341–63, 350. 
93 D’Argent (n 12) 220. 
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a central role in connecting the injury that becomes the object of reparation and the 
internationally wrongful act but is evidently underexplored in international law and 
international courts and tribunals tend to approach the matter in an ad hoc manner 
depending on the primary obligations at stake and the circumstances of each case. Perhaps 
even more importantly for the purposes of the present inquiry the approach of the ICJ and 
to a certain extent of other international judicial institutions to remedies is characterized by 
diversity and flexibility. These two features, helpful as they may be in accommodating a 
wide variety of situations, they make it quite hard to establish clear patterns concerning 
how the obligation to make reparation is to be treated by international adjudicatory bodies. 
All these characteristics and intricacies of the obligation to make reparation and the law of 
remedies in international adjudication essentially complicate the question how the 
allocation of the obligation to make reparation among multiple responsible actors is to be 
performed. They also make tremendously difficult at least at first sight the articulation of a 
general rule capable of capturing and accommodating all possible situations since so many 
things seem to depend on the particular primary rule in question, on the occurrence of 
damage and its form and on the approach that each judicial institution takes in respect of 
remedies and so forth.  
For all these reasons, the analysis will now turn to the general framework of the law of 
international responsibility as well as to the different typologies of ‘responsibility sharing’. 
It will also explore the position adopted by the ILC on the matter during its codification 
work as well as the efforts of scholars to articulate a grand principle for the allocation of 
the obligation to make reparation among multiple responsible actors. This will assist us in 
better understanding the broader context as well as the different situations in which such 
questions may arise before inquiring how the ICJ has in fact dealt with such situations. It 
will also reveal a stark contradiction between the scholarly work on the matter and practice 
in international dispute settlement. 
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III. Plurality of Responsible Actors, the ILC, and the Principle of 
Joint and Several Liability  
1. Basic principles of the regime of international responsibility  
Having sketched out the contours of the obligation to make reparation as a consequence of 
an internationally wrongful act, as well as the marshlands of remedies and damage, it is 
time to inquire about the broader context. This is necessary to investigate whether the 
cadre juridique of international responsibility takes a particular stance towards situations 
involving multiple responsible actors or whether structurally and from a normative 
perspective it remains neutral. From a bird’s eye view it seems that there is one basic 
principle underpinning the entire regime of international responsibility and another two 
underlying the obligation to make reparation, as the latter has been described in the 
previous sections.  
A fundamental, crosscutting principle of the regime of international responsibility is that of 
‘independent responsibility’, namely the concept that each State is only responsible for its 
own conduct and its own internationally wrongful acts.94 This is apparent both from the 
wording of Article 1 ARSIWA and the commentary, which recognize that every 
internationally wrongful act of the State entails its international responsibility. The general 
rule is that of independent responsibility,95 and this is also stressed in the commentary of 
Article 47 ARSIWA, which addresses the issue of invocation of responsibility in case of a 
plurality of responsible States.96 With respect to situations of ‘derivative’ responsibility as 
envisaged in the ARSIWA,97 it is argued that even in the cases of ‘participation’ of an 
actor to the internationally wrongful act of another, the former is again held responsible 
because of its own conduct that has in a certain way facilitated or formed part of the 
																																																								
94 Cheng, General Principles (n 27) 213. Cheng recognized certain ‘exceptions’ to this general 
principle of law, ie cases of ‘assumed’ or ‘legal responsibility’, but did not consider any of these as 
affecting the principle of individual responsibility proper (ibid 213–17). 
95 Ibid. 
96 ARSIWA Article 47 with commentaries, 124, para 1, 125, paras 6-7. 
97 ARSIWA Articles 16, 17 and 18; See also DARIO Part II, Chapter IV and Part V. See for an 
analysis, Fry (n 91); V Lanovoy, ‘Complicity in Internationally Wrongful Act’ in 
Nollkaemper/Plakokefalos, Principles of Shared Responsibility (n 12) 134–68.  
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internationally wrongful act of the principal actor.98 Thus, the principle of independent 
responsibility is reaffirmed. 
Turning to the two basic tenets of the obligation to make reparation, first, as expressly 
stated in Article 31(1) ARSIWA, the general principle is that ‘full reparation’ for the injury 
sustained should be made.99 International courts and tribunals have long affirmed this 
general rule.100 The locus classicus for the articulation of the principle of full reparation, 
frequently referred to in the ARSIWA commentary, is the PCIJ judgment in the Chorzów 
Factory case. In the merits phase of the proceedings, the Court expressed the obligation to 
make reparation for failure to carry out an engagement in the following terms:101  
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act … 
is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences 
																																																								
98 Cf S Besson, ‘La pluralite d’Etats responsables Vers une solidarite international?’ (2007) 17 
RSDIE 13, 21; d’Argent (n 12) 213–14; cf Crawford, State Responsibility (n 30) 336–39 for only 
very extreme cases of coercion should be conceptually excluded from our understanding of State 
responsibility being based on the principle of independent responsibility. Cf also ARSIWA 
commentary, 67, para 10. 
99 ARSIWA Article 31(1) and 34; DARIO Article 31(1) and 34 (emphasis added); D Selton, 
‘Reparations’ in MPEPIL (August 2015) MN 2; Gray, ‘Remedies’ (n 40) 872; but see also other 
parts of the ARSIWA commentaries referring to this principle in different contexts, eg the 
characterization of Article 50 ECHR as lex specialis because it provides for ‘just satisfaction’ 
instead of ‘full reparation’ (ARSIWA commentary, 94, para 2); the fact that combination of 
different forms of reparation is essential in some cases because that is the only way to achieve full 
reparation (ARSIWA commentary, 95, para 2); that flexibility regarding the particular form of 
reparation to be granted in practice exists as far as the principle of full reparation is not impaired 
(ARSIWA commentary, 96, para 6); the fact that loss of profit is recognized as compensable 
damage (Article 36(2) ARSIWA and commentary, 104–105, paras 27-31); and the provision that 
interest shall be paid when necessary to ensure full reparation (Article 38 ARSIWA). 
100 For example, Lusitania Cases (United States/Germany), UNRIAA, Vol VII, 1 November 1923, 
32-44 (emphasis in original). The opinion proclaimed that it was ‘a general rule in both common 
and civil law countries … to give complete pecuniary compensation for loss resulting to claimant 
from death of human being’ (ibid).  
101 As the PCIJ judgment in this case is essentially the beginning and the premise of almost every 
study, paper, or codification effort concerning reparations in international law, it is worth quoting 
in length. 
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of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all 
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed,102  
defining the form and measure of reparation as:  
Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum 
corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the 
award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be 
covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it—such are the 
principles which should serve to determine the amount of compensation 
due for an act contrary to international law.103 
In view of the remedial undertones of reparation as described above, however, there is no 
room for punitive or exemplary damages against the responsible State.104 
Second, the injured party should not end up through reparation having more than it would 
have had, had the obligation been performed. In other words, the purpose of the obligation 
to make reparation is not for the injured State to become unjustly enriched; double 
recovery is expressly precluded.105 According to Gray the PCIJ’s cautious approach in 
assessing the compensation due to the two injured companies in the Chorzów Factory case 
as a single lump sum provides evidence of ‘[t]he basic principle that damages should not 
lead to overcompensation of the victim’.106  In the end, the injured State is entitled to full 
																																																								
102 Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity), Merits, PCIJ Series A, No 17, 4, 47. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) 
Compensation, Judgment of 2 February 2018, para 31. But see for an early survey of practice 
supporting the existence of such damages in international law C Eagleton, ‘Measure of Damages in 
International Law’ (1929) 39 Yale Law Journal 52. 
105 See Article 34 ARSIWA and commentary, 96, para 3. See also Article 36 ARSIWA and 
commentary, 99, para 4, 105, paras 32-33; Article 38 ARSIWA and commentary, 109, para 11; 
Article 39 ARSIWA and commentary, 110, para 2; more clearly for Article 47(2)(a) ARSIWA and 
commentary, 125, para 9. See also DARIO Article 48 and commentaries, 76-77. Cheng, General 
Principles (n 27) 235–37. 
106 Gray, Judicial Remedies (n 56) 81; ‘the two companies formed an economic unit and to attempt 
separate assessment would involve the risk of compensating the same loss twice.’ (ibid). 
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reparation for the damage suffered as result of the responsible State’s wrongful conduct 
and for that damage only. 
On the margins of these two basic principles underlining the obligation to make reparation, 
the ILC has left some room for the consideration of the interests of the responsible entity. 
Thus, equity and justice may sometimes dictate that a particular form of reparation or its 
amount should be decreased or balanced,107 while the operation of the principle of 
proportionality as envisaged within the different forms of reparation aims to strike a fair 
balance of the interests of the different parties involved. Notably though and affirming the 
centrality of the principle of full reparation proportionality instead of being articulated 
within that general rule is reserved for consideration within each specific form of 
reparation.108  
2. Typologies of multiple responsible actors that all contribute to the same damage 
The framework established by the ILC, as described in the previous section, is—for its 
most part—conceptually based on a bilateralised approach to international relations,109 and 
the principle of independent responsibility. A state is considered responsible for the breach 
of its own international obligations, by means of its own conduct, consisting of acts or 
omissions attributable to it. As a consequence of such international responsibility, it has to 
provide reparation for the injury caused by its own internationally wrongful acts, and that 
is also what the injured state is entitled to.   
However, the international community has long stopped operating on such a strictly 
bilateral basis, if it ever did so in the first place.110 The traditional international law of 
coexistence has turned into an international law of cooperation, as situations and cases of 
																																																								
107 See, for example, ARSIWA commentary, 100, para 7. Fairness is the principle that underlies 
also the inclusion of Article 39 ARSIWA which requires that the conduct of the injured party shall 
be taken into account for the assessment of the form and measure of reparation; Crawford, State 
Responsibility 482–85. For the place of proportionality in the Chorzów Factory judgment and 
international investment arbitrations, see Desierto (n 57) 439–47.  
108 ARSIWA commentary, 96, para 5. 
109 Aust, Complicity (n 4) 13 and his n 6, 269 –70. Cf G Nolte, ‘From Dionisio Anzilotti to Roberto 
Ago: The Classical International Law of State Responsibility and the Traditional Primacy of a 
Bilateral Conception of Inter-state Relations’ (2002) 13 EJIL 1083. 
110 Cf Crawford, State Responsibility (n 30) 326. 
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cooperative action among states, international organizations and other actors multiply.111 
The debates taking place in the context of the ongoing conflict in Yemen regarding which 
States are to be held responsible for violations of international humanitarian law by the 
Saudi-led coalition is quite telling in that respect.112 Still this depicts only one type of 
situations that may involve multiple responsible actors. As Nollkaemper puts it:113  
These developments have led to an increase in the number of situations in which it 
is necessary to ascertain who, among the multiplicity of actors involved in 
cooperation, is to answer for the failure to live up to promises and abide by 
agreements, and who is to provide reparation to any injured parties. 
The term ‘shared responsibility’ has been devised to describe this range of cases when 
multiple actors contribute through their conduct to ‘a single harmful outcome’ and 
responsibility for this harmful outcome ‘is distributed among more than one of the 
contributing actors’.114 The term is used in a descriptive manner, as an umbrella term to 
																																																								
111 A Nollkaemper/D Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Conceptual 
Framework’ (2013) 34 MichILJ 359, 362; A Nollkaemper, ‘Introduction’ in 
Nollkaemper/Plakokefalos, Principles of Shared Responsibility (n 12) 4-6. 
112 See, for example, R Goodman, ‘US Seeks New Assurances from Saudis on Civilian Casualties- 
but is that even possible?’, Just Security, 21 April 2017, available at 
https://www.justsecurity.org/40173/seeks-assurances-saudis-civilian-casualties-but-possible/; E 
Robinson, ‘Arms Exports to Saudi Arabia in the High Court: what is a “serious violation of 
international humanitarian law”?’, EJIL:Talk!, 3 April 2017, available at 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/arms-exports-to-saudi-arabia-in-the-high-court-what-is-a-serious-
violation-of-international-humanitarian-law/; A Asteriti, ‘The Use of Cluster Munitions by Saudi 
Arabia in Yemen and the Responsibility of the United Kingdom’, EJIL:Talk!, 7 March 2017, 
available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-use-of-cluster-munitions-by-saudi-arabia-in-yemen-and-
the-responsibility-of-the-united-kingdom/; R Goodman/S Oakford, ‘Did U.S. Provide Helicopter 
Used in Attack of Somali Refugees in Yemen?’, Just Security, 24 March 2017, available at 
https://www.justsecurity.org/39210/united-states-implicated-helicopter-somali-refugees-yemen/.  
113 Nollkaemper, ‘Introduction’ (n 111) 6. 
114 Ibid 6–7; Nollkaemper/Jacobs (n 111) 366–68. The thesis adopts the terminology of ‘shared 
responsibility’ which has been developed in the context of the ‘SHARES’ project at the University 
of Amsterdam. The project was envisaged to study and explore ‘shared responsibility’ and its 
manifestations and consequences in international law. See for more detail 
http://www.sharesproject.nl/; A Nollkaemper/D Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility in International 
Law: A Conceptual Framework’ SHARES Research Paper No 3 (2011), ACIL 2011-07, available 
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encompass various types of cases involving multiple responsible actors, and is not meant 
to prescribe any particular legal consequences for the allocation of such responsibility, eg 
for the obligation to make reparation. A distinctive feature of the situations captured by the 
term ‘shared responsibility’ is that responsibility is conceptualized as falling upon the 
multiple responsible actors separately and not as a collectivity.115 For example, if the 
international responsibility of the EU was engaged because of a violation by the union of 
an international obligation, for which it has exclusive competence, this situation would not 
fall within the term’s purview. 
A prior issue to cases of multiple responsible actors is that damage to a State may occur in 
certain cases without it necessarily being the result of a violation of an international 
obligation. Indeed, the ILC dedicated a separate project to the issue of allocation of 
liability arising out of activities not prohibited by international law.116 Moreover, the case 
might be that multiple States may factually cause harm to another State without necessarily 
all being equally responsible under the law for doing so.117  Alternatively, it could also be 
the case that along with one or more States other causes contribute to the occurrence of 
damage.118 In that respect, different causes of the same injury may be found in various 
forms. Adopting the categorization of Bollecker-Stern, Plakokefalos puts multiple causes 
contributing to the same injury to three different categories: cumulative causation, 
concurrent or complementary causation, and parallel or pre-emptive causation.119 These 
other causes could range from a natural event,120 to the injured State’s own conduct,121 to 
																																																								
at http://www.sharesproject.nl/publication/shared-responsibility-in-international-law-a-concept-
paper/. 
115 Nollkaemper, ‘Introduction’ (n 111) 12. 
116 See ILC’s work on ‘International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not 
Prohibited by International Law’ available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/9.shtml#fout, which was 
eventually split in two projects one for the ‘Prevention of Transboundary Damage from Hazardous 
Activities’ and ‘International Liability in case of Loss from Transboundary Harm Arising Out of 
Hazardous Activities’. 
117 A Nollkaemper, ‘Introduction’ (n 111) 8. 
118 The existence of multiple causes contributing towards a harmful outcome is called 
‘overdetermination’, see Plakokefalos (n 86) 472. 
119 Plakokefalos (n 86) 472–73 referring to B Bollecker-Stern, La préjudice dans la théorie de la 
responsabilité internationale (1973), 276ff. 
120 For example, force majeure could be considered such a circumstance. 
121 See Article 39 ARSIWA. 
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actions of actors that are not responsible under international law122 or under the specific 
international law regime under consideration.123 When all actors contributing to a single 
harmful outcome are also responsible under the law for doing so, a case of shared 
responsibility, as analysed above, arises. In the event of shared responsibility not only 
international responsibility itself, but also the obligation to make reparation for the single 
harmful outcome caused is shared among the plurality of actors not as a collectivity but 
falls upon each one of them individually.124  
From a taxonomy perspective, a single injury may result from several internationally 
wrongful acts committed by several actors or may be caused by one internationally 
wrongful act committed by several actors.125 In the latter category, the single 
internationally wrongful act may occur through the concerted action of two or more States 
or through a common organ established by them.126 For example, if two riparian States 																																																								
122 For example, in the CME B.V. v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 3 September 
2001 the tribunal found that an individual not responsible under international law had assisted the 
State to violate its treaty obligations towards the investor. 
123 In El Masri v Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App No 39630/09, Judgment of 13 
September 2003 (Grand Chamber), for instance, only Macedonia was responsible under the 
European Convention of Human Rights to which it was a party, whereas the US could not be held 
responsible under this specific regime by which it was not bound. 
124 A Nollkaemper, ‘Issues of Shared Responsibility before the International Court of Justice’ 
ACIL No 2011-11, 5. 
125 See d’Argent (n 12) 211; Besson (n 98) 22 distinguishes between ‘fait conjoint’ and ‘fait 
distinct’, which may both engage the responsibility of multiple responsible actors for the same 
damage. Cf Crawford, State Responsibility (n 30) 333 who uses the concepts of ‘attribution of 
conduct’ and ‘attribution of responsibility’ to categorise the different situations of joint and 
collective action of States. For a slightly different categorization see Nollkaemper, ‘Introduction’ 
(n 111) 9–11, speaking of ‘concurrent responsibility’, ‘cumulative responsibility’ and ‘joint 
responsibility’ the first corresponding to our category of several wrongful acts causing a single 
injury, the third to our second category of one wrongful act committed by several actors causing a 
single injury, and the second category of ‘cumulative responsibility’ encompassing cases from both 
our 1categories. 
126 This was for example the case in the Eurotunnel Arbitration, PCA Case No 2003-06, Partial 
Award, 30 January 2007. See also ASRIWA commentary, 64, para 2 and Article 47 ARSIWA. 
This coincides with the multiple attribution & concerted conduct paradigm in Crawford’s 
terminology, see Crawford, State Responsibility (n 30) 333–34. This could also conceptually 
encompass situations of ‘co-perpetration’ if the multiple States are bound by and end up breaching 
through their individual conduct the same international obligation causing thus a single injury. Cf 
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have established a river commission to manage a shared watercourse which then violates 
the obligation to not cause transboundary harm through pollution of the watercourse, there 
is going to be a single internationally wrongful act attributed to both States causing a single 
injury.127 In the first category, the several internationally wrongful acts could be of the 
same nature for instance when two riparian States pollute a shared watercourse in violation 
of their customary law obligation to not cause transboundary harm and cause a single 
injury to a third riparian State.128 Alternatively, the several internationally wrongful acts 
could be of a different nature for example in cases of participation of a State in the 
internationally wrongful act of another,129 eg in the case of unlawful renditions.130 
According to Besson, the plurality of responsible actors may flow either from a special 
relationship131 between them, for example under the circumstances of Articles 16–18 
ARSIWA, or each one of them may act independently from the other.132 These categories 
are of course not clear-cut, as for example if the aid or assistance is of sufficient gravity to 
be indispensable for the commission of the principal wrongful act then it may transform 
into a ‘concerted action’ type of situation rather than an aid and assistance under Article 16 
ARSIWA situation.133 It is also possible to envisage other bases upon which the 
aforementioned categorization may be performed. For example, Noyes and Smith have 
proposed that the most helpful way to categorize cases of multiple State responsibility is 
by inquiring whether the wrongful act under consideration has been the result of concerted 
or independent conduct.134 
																																																								
however d’Argent (n 12) 241–44, who argues that situations of co-perpetration are better 
categorized as ‘A-type’ situations of shared responsibility, ie they should be considered as several 
(identical) internationally wrongful acts causing a singly injury rather than one internationally 
wrongful act committed by several distinct actors. 
127 See for the same example d’Argent (n 12) 212. 
128 This coincides with the multiple attribution & independent conduct paradigm in Crawford’s 
terminology, see Crawford, State Responsibility (n 30) 334. 
129 This coincides with the paradigm of a State being ‘implicated’ in the internationally wrongful 
act of another State in Crawford’s terminology, see Crawford, State Responsibility (n 30) 336–39. 
130 See for this example d’Argent (n 12) 212. 
131 Cf for an early account Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations (n 29) 191–92. 
132 Besson (n 98) 21. See also ILC, ARSIWA commentary, 64, para 2. 
133 Crawford, State Responsibility (n 30) 402; Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations (n 29) 191; 
cf d’Argent (n 12) 212. 
134 J Noyes/B Smith, ‘State Responsibility and the Principle of Joint and Several Liability’ (1988) 
13 Yale Law Journal 225, 228ff. 
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An important clarification is in order at this point. A discussion of the issue of allocation of 
the responsibility among multiple responsible actors presupposes that there is a single 
harmful outcome, which is causally indivisible. If the conduct of each responsible entity 
causes a distinct part of the harm sustained by the injured State, then there is no issue of 
responsibility sharing, but rather each actor will be responsible for its own contribution and 
the portion of the harm that they have caused.135 Thus, if certain portion of the outcome 
can as a matter of causation be traced back to one or more of the responsible actors then 
they will bear responsibility, and consequently the obligation to make reparation for the 
harm caused, for that severable portion of the damage. If the harm, however, is generally 
indivisible, as will happen in most cases, apportionment of the harm among the multiple 
responsible entities will not be, factually or legally possible. Ultimately, whether the 
harmful outcome is causally divisible or not, is a matter for the causal test,136 but this issue 
is significant because in this latter case complex issues arise concerning how the allocation 
of the obligation to make reparation among multiple responsible actors is to be 
performed.137 
2. The allocation of responsibility in case of a plurality of responsible actors in the 
work of the ILC 
In its work on the topic of international responsibility, the ILC did not delve much into the 
principles applicable to cases involving multiple responsible actors.138 Generally speaking, 
although it recognized that often ‘internationally wrongful conduct results from the 
collaboration of several States rather than of one State acting alone’139, it considered that 
usually even in cases of collaborative action among States the principle of independent 
responsibility will apply and responsibility and its consequences will be determined 
accordingly.140 This notwithstanding the Commission made sure to highlight that this does 																																																								
135 A Nollkaemper, ‘Introduction’ (n 111) 7–8. 
136 Ibid; For the issue of causation see generally Plakokefalos (n 86); cf Gattini, ‘Breach of 
International Obligations’ in Nollkaemper/Plakokefalos, Principles of Shared Responsibility (n 12) 
25–59, 28–31. 
137 Cf A Nollkaemper/D Jacobs, ‘Introduction: Mapping the Normative Framework for the 
Distribution of Shared Responsibility’ in A Nollkaemper/D Jacobs (eds), Distribution of 
Responsibilities in International Law (CUP 2015) 1–35, 3. See also for the same problématique 
Aust, Complicity (n 4) 275–76. 
138 Crawford, State Responsibility (n 30) 326–27. 
139 ARSIWA commentary, 64, para 2. 
140 ARSIWA commentary, 64, para 5. 
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not mean that ‘other States may not also be held responsible for the conduct in question or 
for injury caused as a result’.141 
Additionally, the ILC accepted that it is possible that ‘two separate factors may combine to 
cause damage’.142 In support of this assertion, the commentary to Article 31 ARSIWA 
codifying the principle of ‘full reparation’ referred to two examples from international 
jurisprudence: the Tehran Hostages case,143 which involved the combination of acts of 
private individuals and those of a State, and the Corfu Channel case,144 which involved the 
combination of the acts of two different States. According to the commentary, in these 
cases that multiple factors, referred to as ‘concurrent causes’, combine to cause injury 
international practice and jurisprudence ‘do not support the reduction or attenuation of 
reparation’ even if only one of the concurrent causes is ascribable to the responsible 
State.145 According to the ILC, there are two exceptions to this principle: The contributory 
fault of the victim state,146 and the cases in which the portion of the injury attributable to 
the responsible State is causally severable from the rest. In this latter case, as explained in 
the previous section the responsible State will be under an obligation to make reparation 
for the causally severable part of the damage it has caused. 
A special issue are cases of ‘derivative responsibility’, ie the attribution to a State of 
responsibility in connection to the internationally wrongful conduct of another State.147 
These are the cases of participation of a State (or another actor) to the internationally 
wrongful act of another State. Among such cases of derivative responsibility, aid or 
assistance under Article 16 can be considered the most important one and the one most 
usually occurring in international law.148 For these cases, when a State is held responsible 
																																																								
141 Article 1 ARSIWA and commentary, 33–34, para 6. 
142 ARSIWA commentary, 93, para 12. 
143 United States Diplomatic and Consular Stuff in Tehran (USA v Iran) Judgment [1980] ICJ Rep 
3. 
144 Corfu Channel (UK v Albania) Merits [1949] ICJ Rep 4. 
145 ARSIWA commentary, 93, para 12. 
146 Ibid. 
147 ARSIWA Articles 16, 17 and 18; See also DARIO Part II, Chapter IV and Part V. See for an 
analysis, Fry (n 91); Lanovoy (n 97).  
148 For a thorough discussion of situations of aid or assistance or otherwise know as ‘complicity’ in 
international law, as well as its intricacies and limitations see Aust (n 4); V Lanovoy, Complicity 
and Its Limits in the Law of International Responsibility (Hart 2016); Lowe, ‘Responsibility for the 
Conduct of Other States’ (n 4). 
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in connection with the internationally wrongful act of another State the ILC only briefly 
addressed the implications for the allocation of the obligation to make reparation. In the 
commentary to Article 16, it drew a distinction between cases that the aid or assistance is 
indispensable to the overall wrongful conduct (‘a necessary element in the wrongful act in 
the absence of which it could not have occurred’) and the injury ‘can be concurrently 
attributed to the assisting and the acting State’ and cases of aid or assistance that have a 
minor contribution (‘only an incidental factor’) to the injury suffered compared to the 
principal wrongful act.149 For this latter category the commentary explained that the 
assisting State ‘should not necessarily be held to indemnify the victim for all the 
consequences of the act, but only for those which … flow from its own conduct’.150 The 
ILC thus left room for the apportioning of the consequences of the overall internationally 
wrongful conduct, and in particular of the obligation to make reparation, among the 
assisting and the assisted States depending on the circumstances of each case and the 
significance and gravity of the aid provided.151  
Notwithstanding that the ILC recognized that cases involving multiple responsible actors 
might arise, the ARSIWA did not expressly spell out what this would mean for the 
apportionment of the obligation to make reparation. The only provision that could be 
considered relevant for this issue—apart from certain references in the commentary 
mentioned above152 —is Article 47.153 Article 47, however, is a rule on the invocation of 
responsibility in case of a plurality of responsible states, rather than a rule or a mechanism 
for the allocation of such responsibility and the obligation to make reparation. 
Characteristically, the commentary refers to the Nauru case before the ICJ in which the 
Court highlighted that the fact that Nauru could bring an application against Australia as 
the sole respondent did not prejudice the matter of whether Australia would also be called 
to make reparation for the entirety of the damage sustained by Nauru.154 Thus invocation 
of responsibility and allocation of the obligation to make reparation are two separate 
issues. Nonetheless, Article 47 dictates that ‘the responsibility of each state may be 
invoked in relation to [the internationally wrongful] act’155 in question and then reverts to 																																																								
149 ARSIWA commentary, 67, para 10. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Cf Aust, Complicity (n 4) 279–81, 289. 
152 ARSIWA commentary, 67, para 10 and 93–94, paras 12–13. 
153 See also Article 48 DARIO. 
154 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v Australia) Preliminary Objections, Judgment 
[1992] ICJ Rep 240. 
155 Article 47(1) ARSIWA. 
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the general principle described in the first section of this chapter that the injured state is not 
entitled ‘to recover, by way of compensation, more than the damage it has suffered’.156  
Thus, it reaffirms the general principle of independent responsibility which ‘is not 
diminished or reduced’ due to the simultaneous responsibility of other States for the 
internationally wrongful act.157 This leaves open the question from which State the injured 
party can request the payment of compensation for the damage caused, and whether in case 
one of the responsible States pays the entire amount due there is a right of recourse against 
the other responsible States.158 In that respect the commentary is adamant that the 
provision neither espouses nor rejects a principle of joint and several responsibility as 
found in many domestic legal orders.159 This principle will be analysed in more detail in 
the next section of this chapter. 
Finally, Article 47 formally covers only one of the categories that we have described as 
leading to shared responsibility for a single injury, that caused by one internationally 
wrongful act committed by several States. The idea that a single injury may be caused also 
by several internationally wrongful acts is acknowledged in the commentary to Article 47 
where it is asserted that in this case of shared responsibility ‘the responsibility of each 
State is determined individually, on the basis of its own conduct and by reference to its 
own international obligations’.160 According to d’Argent the silence of the ARSIWA (and 
the DARIO) for this type of situations of shared responsibility ‘is best explained by the fact 
that no specific rule is actually required in such cases’ and the allocation of the obligation 
to make reparation is simply done by application of the basic rules of international 
responsibility.161 
3. The principle of joint and several liability and how to allocate the obligation to make 
reparation among multiple responsible actors 
The ILC’s bare silence when it came to elucidating the rules and principles on the basis of 
which the allocation of the obligation to make reparation among multiple responsible 
actors is to be performed, which admittedly stems from the scarcity of international 																																																								
156 Article 47(2)(a) ARSIWA. 
157 ARSIWA commentary, 124, para 1. 
158 Article 47(2)(b) ARSIWA. 
159 ARSIWA commentary, 125, paras 5–6. 
160 ARSIWA commentary, 125, para 8. Notably, as an example for international jurisprudence to 
support this position is cited the Corfu Channel case (UK v Albania) Judgment [1949] ICJ Rep 4. 
161 D’Argent (n 12) 217. 
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practice in the field,162 has left scholars searching for answers to this increasingly urgent 
question. 
Brownlie has asserted that the principles governing joint responsibility are ‘as yet 
indistinct’.163 As we saw, the ILC in the commentary to Article 47 ARSIWA emphasized 
that the provision neither espoused a general rule of ‘joint and several responsibility’ nor 
excluded that more than one States may ‘be responsible for the same internationally 
wrongful act’.164 According to the commentary this would depend on the circumstances of 
each case and the primary rules binding each State under consideration. In that respect the 
commentary also referred to the so-called domestic analogies and their usefulness in the 
international law context of State responsibility.165 Under the domestic legal orders of 
various States there often exist rules and principles establishing the ‘joint and several’ or 
‘solidary’ responsibility of joint tortfeasors, ie persons that jointly cause injury to a third 
party.166 The principle of ‘joint and several responsibility’ means that each of the actors 
engaged in unlawful conduct can be considered ‘responsible for the acts of the others 
(“joint”) and may be individually asked to make full reparation (“several”)’.167 However, it 
is important to not assume that these concepts can automatically be transposed to the 
international plane not the least because of fundamental terminological differences 
between the domestic and the international legal orders as well as the lack of a compulsory 
dispute settlement system in international law.168 In international law unless it is otherwise 																																																								
162 Vermeer-Künzli (n 48) 253; See Noyes/Smith (n 134) 231–36 for some thoughts on the reasons 
for this very limited practice. 
163 Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, OUP 2012) 554. 
164 ARSIWA commentary, 125, para 6. 
165 ARSIWA commentary, 124, para 3; Crawford, State Responsibility (n 30) 328–31. 
166 ARISWA commentary, at 93, n 471, and at 124, para 3. It has to be noted that the commentary 
uses the terms ‘responsibility’ and ‘liability’ interchangeably in this context most probably because 
the term ‘joint and several liability’ comes from common law, but this could lead to confusion 
regarding the fundamental distinction between responsibility for one’s own internationally 
wrongful conduct and the obligation to make reparation for conduct that is not per se lawful under 
international law.  
167 ILC, Third Report Crawford, para 272; D’Argent (n 12) 244; See also ARSIWA commentary, 
93, n 471 referring to the US pleadings in the Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 case before the ICJ 
according to which the principle of joint and several liability means that ‘[a]n aggrieved plaintiff 
may sue any or all joint tortfeasors, jointly or severally, although he may collect from them, or any 
one or more from them, only the full amount of his damage’ (Memorial of 2 December 1958). 
168 See also D’Argent (n 12) 244–46; For the difficulties of this particular analogy see also Besson 
(n 98) 34–36.  
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expressly established (usually) under a particular treaty, the principle of independent 
responsibility is the general rule, each State bearing responsibility and the obligation to 
make reparation for its own internationally wrongful acts (and the internationally wrongful 
acts of a State to which it may have participated).169 Thus, and leaving aside the various 
terms currently in use,170 starting from the fundamental premise of independent 
responsibility a rule of ‘joint and several responsibility’ in international law would only 
make sense at the level of the allocation of the obligation to make reparation among 
multiple responsible States when each one’s international responsibility for the damage at 
issue had already been established.171  
That being said the principle of ‘joint and several responsibility’ is not as such unknown to 
international law.172 Certain international conventions provide for it in specific contexts. 
For example, it forms a central tenet of the regime established under the Convention on the 
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects173 and the Law of the Sea 
Convention.174 In their seminal article on ‘State Responsibility and the Principle of Joint 
and Several Liability’ in 1988 Noyes and Smith pled for the necessity in international law 
of a principle of joint and several liability as found in the domestic legal systems.175 They 
considered that any ‘mature system of international law must comprehend the 
responsibility of multiple state actors for a single event—including the responsible states’ 
duties of reparation’.176 Their study of the scarce state practice and the relevant decisions 
of international courts and tribunals lead them to conclude that ‘sufficient support’ existed 
for a ‘principle of joint and several liability in international law’ in terms of the obligation 
to make reparation of multiple responsible States.177 Orakhelashvili on the other hand has 
																																																								
169 ARSIWA commentary, 124, para 3; d’Argent (n 12) 247. 
170 For example, Brownlie refers to ‘joint and several responsibility’ (see Crawford, Brownlie’s 
Principles 554), Besson to ‘le principe de la solidarité’ (Besson (n 98) 34), Noyes and Smith to 
‘joint and several liability’ (n 134). 
171 Cf S Wittich, ‘Joint Tortfeasors in Investment Law’ in C Binder et al (eds), Internaational 
Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (OUP 2009) 708–
23. 
172 See for a summary Crawford, Third Report, paras 272–78. 
173 29 March 1972, 961 UNTS 187, Articles IV and V. 
174 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, Article 139. 
175 Noyes/Smith (n 134) 262–66. 
176 Ibid. See also for a similar point on how the inclusion of Article 16 ARSIWA evidences ‘the 
moral sophistication of international law’ see Lowe (n 4) 12–13. 
177 Noyes/Smith (n 134) 226, 
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even more affirmatively asserted that a rule of joint and several responsibility constitutes 
positive international law and considered that Article 47 ARSIWA is relevant to situations 
of aid or assistance.178 In that respect, Aust has warned that this could lead to the rather 
unfair situation that the assisting State is held accountable for ‘a larger part of the injury 
than their actual share of contribution’.179 Perhaps the strongest affirmation of the 
existence of the concept of joint and several liability in international law has been offered 
by Judge Simma in his separate opinion in the Oil Platforms case concerning the so-called 
‘generic counterclaim’ of the US.180 After conducting a comparative study on how 
domestic legal orders approach the issue of multiple parties contributing to a single injury 
(‘multiple tortfeasors’), Judge Simma concluded that various legal systems have addressed 
this problem with ‘striking similarity’.181 In what he called a ‘textbook situation calling for 
such an exercise in legal analogy’,182 he argued that the principle of joint and several 
liability existed in international law as a general principle of law under Article 38(1)(c) of 
the Court’s Statute.183 However, even Judge Simma admitted that this would not 
necessarily prejudge to what extent the party found responsible upon such a basis had to 
make reparation for the entirety of the damage sustained.184 
																																																								
178 A Orakhelashvili, ‘Division of Reparation Between Responsible Entities’ in J Crawford et al 
(eds), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP 2010) 647–65, 656–59. He accepts however 
that ‘no a priori answer can be given’ to the question of the valuation of compensation against the 
aiding or assisting State ‘as everything depends on the level of complicity and participation, the 
causal link, the capacity of individual States to pay, and the availability of judicial venues’ (ibid 
659). He concludes his assessment of the topic arguing that ‘the law, or at least its application, is 
currently in many respects uncertain, unsatisfactory, and even chaotic’ (ibid 664) and that 
application does not always happen with a view to effective redress of the injury sustained by the 
victim (ibid 664–65). 
179 Aust, Complicity (n 4) 279–80. 
180 Oil Platforms (Iran v USA) Judgment, Sep Op Simma [2003] ICJ Rep 324, 342ff, paras 35 et 
seq. 
181 Oil Platforms (Iran v USA) Judgment, Sep Op Simma [2003] ICJ Rep 324, 354, para 66. For 
more detail regarding the argument see Aust (n 4) 274 –75; Crawford, State Responsibility (n 30) 
329–31. 
182 Oil Platforms (Iran v USA) Judgment, Sep Op Simma [2003] ICJ Rep 324, 354, para 66 
183 Ibid 354–58, paras 67–74. 
184 Ibid 358, para 73. 
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The voices advocating for the existence or the need of existence of a principle of joint and 
several responsibility or liability in international law are far and few between.185 More 
sober accounts of the practice of states and international judicial institutions point to other 
solutions to the problem of the allocation of the obligation to make reparation among 
multiple responsible actors. From these there are two that are particularly pertinent to the 
purposes of the present inquiry and also seem to be supported by the practice of the ICJ 
and affirmed by that of other international courts and tribunals. First, d’Argent having 
examined the different instances of shared responsibility based on the taxonomy described 
above (ie same internationally wrongful act committed by several responsible States 
causing a single injury & several internationally wrongful acts committed by several 
responsible States contributing to a single injury) and how the ILC ‘toolbox’ of rules and 
principles would apply to them comes to the following conclusion.186 He claims that 
despite the fact that the ARSIWA (and the DARIO) capture only one of the typologies of 
shared responsibility and not the whole spectrum, ‘orderly’ and ‘reasoned’ application of 
the basic rules, as well as a qualitative approach towards the wrongful acts in question will 
assist us in performing apportionment of the obligation to make reparation pursuant to 
‘equity and logic’.187 Second, Aust discussing how situations of complicity are best 
addressed in international law he concludes that there exists what he calls ‘a network of 
rules on complicity’ in which rules of state responsibility constitute only the first layer.188 
Thus, there are alternative mechanisms, diverse primary rules, more specialized rules on 
state responsibility in specific regimes of international law and so forth that may assist us 
in holding States responsible in cases that a plurality of actors has contributed to the injury 
sustained, even if the general rules of state responsibility do not offer a satisfactory answer 
in every case.189 
																																																								
185 D’Argent (n 12) 245. Very recently in the end product of the SHARES project conducted at the 
University of Amsterdam and the Amsterdam Centre for International Law (see n 114), the ‘Draft 
Principles on Shared Responsibility’, the necessity and usefulness of such a principle has been put 
forward (see for example the presentation of the Draft Principles at the University of Oxford PIL 
Discussion Group on 6 March 2018, available at https://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/draft-principles-shared-
responsibility). It is doubtful however to what extent this is supported by adequate authority in 
international law including judicial practice and does not constitute to the contrary a mere policy 
choice of the project’s investigators. 
186 See generally D’Argent (n 12). 
187 Ibid. 
188 Aust, Complicity (n 4) 376–418. 
189 Cf ibid. 
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4. Interim Conclusions 
The cadre juridique of state responsibility as codified in the ARSIWA is characterized by 
a persistence on the principle of independent responsibility accompanied by an obligation 
to make full reparation as a consequence of an internationally wrongful act. As we have 
seen though there are many cases that States and other actors may share responsibility for a 
single injury and may be called to make reparation to the injured party. The two primary 
types of such ‘responsibility sharing’ in broad brushstrokes occur when on the one hand 
the injury has been caused by one internationally wrongful act caused by several distinct 
actors and on the other when the injury has been caused by several internationally 
wrongful acts caused by several distinct actors. It should be kept in mind, however, that 
this taxonomy is neither singular nor clear-cut. The most pressing problem for our 
purposes is that in the event that the injury is not causally divisible the question arises how 
the obligation to make reparation, especially in the form of monetary compensation, is 
apportioned among the multiple responsible actors.  
The ILC was cognizant of these possibilities but provided very little in terms of applicable 
rules and principles to deal with such situations, and almost nothing concerning the 
distribution of the obligation to make reparation. If anything, its approach was to reaffirm 
that despite the possible existence of several actors contributing to the same damage the 
principle of independent responsibility applies and each one is responsible for their 
wrongful conduct and the damage caused thereof.  
Given the scarcity of available rules and principles scholars have advocated that a solid 
normative basis is necessary to apportion the responsibility and its consequences among 
multiple responsible actors in cases that the harmful outcome is not causally divisible. This 
normative basis has often taken the form of a general principle for the allocation of the 
obligation to make reparation for the damage caused, often in the guise of the principle of 
joint and several responsibility as found in domestic legal systems. It has been argued that 
all things considered this is the fairer manner in which the consequences of international 
responsibility are to be apportioned. And that may well be the case. On the other hand, 
others have argued that the necessary rules and principles that help us address this kind of 
situations already exist within the cadre juridique of international responsibility and that 
there are different ways beyond the realm of international responsibility to secure that co-
responsible actors are held accountable for the consequences of their actions.  
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Both of these positions have their merits and demerits but at the end the normative basis 
upon which the obligation to make reparation is to be apportioned will necessarily be a 
policy choice, taken in light of the wider international legal order and the purposes and 
outcomes one seeks to achieve.190 Such a policy choice encompassing the development of 
a general principle or rule applicable to these situations is beyond the purposes of the 
present thesis, not the least because of space and time constraints. It is also a different kind 
of discussion and has been to a certain extent debated elsewhere.191 The present 
dissertation seeks to accomplish a different objective. In light of the theoretical and 
normative background explored so far, including the contours of the obligation to make 
reparation, the intricacies of remedies in international law, the fundamental principles of 
the regime of international responsibility, as well as the complexities of situations of 
shared responsibility, it will turn to the practice of the ICJ to examine how the Court has 
dealt with the various situations of shared responsibility as described in this chapter.  
Three things can be said from the outset. First, the ICJ and other international courts and 
tribunals seem to have dealt with a variety of cases that damage has been caused by a 
plurality of actors, ranging from situations that involve multiple responsible States to 
situations that involve responsible States and non-state actors that cannot be held 
responsible under international law. Second, neither the ICJ nor other international courts 
and tribunals have picked up any grand principle to address the allocation of the obligation 
to make reparation in these situations but have rather taken a flexible, case-specific 
approach insisting on the application of the basic principles of international responsibility 
in light of the circumstances of the dispute before them. Finally, it seems that international 
dispute settlement bodies when dealing with such situations have explored international 
law beyond the realm of state responsibility in a very creative manner, venturing into the 
fields of primary obligations. In that respect, they have tried to articulate clearly the 
obligations that bind each actor that contributes to the damage and have then grounded 
their responsibility and its consequences in the violation of the said primary obligation. 
  
																																																								
190 Cf Noyes/Smith (n 134) 259. 
191 See the volume by A Nollkaemper/D Jacobs, Distribution of Responsibilities in International 
Law (CUP 2015), and the various contributions there. 
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IV. The International Court of Justice: The obligation to make 
reparation and a plurality of responsible actors 
1. Introductory remarks 
It is fitting for the purposes of this dissertation to focus our enquiry into international 
jurisprudence by examining the case law of the ICJ for two reasons. First, the Court is the 
principal judicial organ of the United Nations and is hence in a unique position to apply 
and interpret general international law given its general subject-matter jurisdiction.192 In 
the words of Brownlie, ‘[w]hilst courts of arbitration may make a contribution, it is the 
Court which, as a mainstream interpreter of general international law, has produced the 
most important decisions on State responsibility.’193 Second, as shown in the previous 
chapter, the work of the ILC on the topic of international responsibility, and in particular 
state responsibility, was shaped by the decisions of the Court in relevant matters—and has 
shaped the Court’s case law accordingly.194 Evidently, some of the decisions examined in 
this chapter pre-date the ILC’s work on state responsibility and the formulation of the 
ARSIWA. However, this exercise is still valuable as to understand the treatment of 
situations involving multiple responsible actors by the Court we need to situate these 
decisions within the broader jurisdictional framework and the Court’s approach to 
remedies. We can then better appreciate why the Court has not been itself an advocate of a 
general rule on the allocation of the obligation to make reparation among multiple 
responsible actors and whether its practice points to any conclusions on how these 
situations can be best handled. 
The chapter will first start with the competence and the practice of the Court in granting 
reparation, and in particular compensation. The analysis focuses mostly on the cases that 
have grappled with compensation rather than restitution or satisfaction for two reasons. 
First, from a practical perspective complicated questions concerning each actor’s 
contribution that is causally connected to the damage, the extent of the damage, and 
																																																								
192 See for the seminal work on the matter H Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law 
by the International Court (Stevens 1958). 
193 I Brownlie, ‘State Responsibility and the International Court of Justice’ (n 64) 11.  
194 Brownlie, ‘State Responsibility and the International Court of Justice’ (n 64) 11–12. R Higgins, 
‘Issues of State Responsibility before the International Court of Justice’ in M Fitzmaurice/D 
Sarooshi, Issues of State Responsibility before International Judicial Institutions (Hart 2004) 1–9, 
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valuation will most often arise in claims requesting the award of monetary compensation. 
Second, despite the fact that in certain situations multiple States may bear international 
responsibility for the same injury, often only one of them will be in a position to offer 
restitution,195 cases of aid or assistance are a pertinent example.196 For its part, satisfaction 
as a form of reparation remains somewhat ambiguous and is often considered coterminous 
with declaratory judgments. The Court itself in the ‘vast majority of its decisions involving 
a claim for reparation, [it] has awarded declarations of wrongfulness (a form of 
satisfaction), often as the sole remedy.’197 In these cases, and although certain conceptual 
issues will still arise concerning the establishment of responsibility of each actor, issues of 
allocation of the obligation to make reparation will hardly be in question. In any event, as 
has been mentioned in Chapter II the different forms of reparation operate in combination 
in order to realize the principle of ‘full reparation’. It is because of the accentuated factual, 
evidentiary, scientific and other difficulties that arise when one attempts to apportion the 
obligation to make reparation in the form of compensation among multiple responsible 
actors that these cases have been considered the most appropriate to be studied for the 
purposes of the present dissertation.198 Thus, the analysis will focus on cases that the Court 
has grappled with compensation as a remedy to the injured State.  
The chapter will then turn to the jurisdictional framework within which the Court operates 
and discuss briefly on the one hand the principle of consent and the bilateralised structure 
of the proceedings before the Court and on the other the Monetary Gold principle. The 
final section will offer some interim conclusions. 
2. The Court’s competence to pronounce upon the obligation to make reparation 
and its practice in awarding compensation 
a. Competence of the Court 
There is no explicit reference in the Court’s Statute199 concerning its competence to award 
remedies to injured States in cases before it. However, under Article 36(2)(d) the Court’s 																																																								
195 Besson (n 98) 23. 
196 Aust, Complicity (n 4) 277. 
197 J Crawford, ‘Flexibility in the Award of Reparation: The Role of the Parties and the Tribunal’ in 
R Wolfrum et al (eds), Contemporary Developments in International Law: Essays in Honour of 
Budislav Vukas (Brill 2015) 690–708, 692. 
198 Cf Besson (n 98) 23. 
199 Statute of the International Court of Justice (26 June 1945) 33 UNTS 933. 
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jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute is extended over ‘the nature or extent of the reparation 
to be made for the breach of an international obligation’.200 Although Article 36(2)(d) is 
technically applicable only to cases brought to the Court by means of a unilateral 
application under the optional clause, it has been long accepted that the Court possesses 
such jurisdiction even for cases that come before it through a compromis or a 
compromissory clause in a multilateral treaty.201 As already mentioned in Chapter II, the 
PCIJ in the jurisdictional phase of the Chorzów Factory case asserted that jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the obligation to make reparation forms an essential part of the jurisdiction to 
adjudicate on the existence of a violation of an international obligation, and that ‘there is 
no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself’.202 More recently, the ICJ has 
confirmed this position in the LaGrand case. In this latter case, the Court held 
that a dispute regarding the appropriate remedy for the violation of the Convention 
alleged by Germany is a dispute that arises out of the interpretation or application 
of the Convention and thus is within the Courts jurisdiction. Where jurisdiction 
exists over a dispute on a particular matter, no separate basis for jurisdiction is 
required by the Court to consider the remedies a party has requested for the breach 
of the obligation.203 
Despite this, it is a rare occasion that the ICJ gets to issue a judgment on reparation, 
including an assessment of compensation due. For one, States that bring their disputes 
before the Court often opt for declaratory judgments, namely judgments that recognize the 
illegality of the conduct of the other State or allocate legal rights between the parties, and 
leave issues of reparation to be determined through diplomatic negotiations—if at all.204 
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Well known examples of this practice is the Eastern Greenland case before the PCIJ,205 
and the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case before the ICJ. 
Second, even if the parties have requested the Court to determine the appropriate remedy 
or have expressly asked for the award of monetary compensation, the Court has more often 
than not skillfully avoided grappling with such requests.206 For example, in order to avoid 
dealing with complicated issues of valuation or pronouncing on the amount of 
compensation due the Court has declared that separate proceedings were necessary for 
such determination in the hope that the parties would come to a settlement in the 
meantime.207 Other times, it has conditioned these separate proceedings on the parties 
failing to achieve an agreement on the amount of compensation, often within certain time-
limits.208 Another ‘avoidance technique’209 is the one employed in the Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros case210 where the Court employed the ‘intersecting wrongs’ approach. It 
recognized that both Hungary and Slovakia were liable to pay compensation and that both 
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were entitled to obtain compensation.211 However, following this finding, it suggested 
that:212 
Given the fact ... that there have been intersecting wrongs by both Parties ... the 
issue of compensation could satisfactorily be resolved in the framework of an 
overall settlement if each of the Parties were to renounce or cancel all financial 
claims and counter-claims. 
It has been argued that by employing the ‘intersecting wrongs’ technique in Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros, the Court took a ‘very imaginative approach to the legal consequences of the 
internationally wrongful acts’.213 In the words of Shaw, commenting on the Court’s 
approach to remedies in Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, ‘the Court is prepared to allocate 
responsibility as between States and … is currently less tempted to enter into the complex 
issue of valuation of damages in a way typical of many arbitration proceedings.’214   
Thus we see that the Court maintains a flexible approach tending to avoid complex 
determinations when it comes to the award of remedies and in particular compensation. 
Equally, if not even more interesting for the purposes of our inquiry are the very few cases 
in which compensation has been actually granted. To this the analysis will now turn. 
																																																								
211 Ibid at 81, para 152. 
212 Ibid para 153. 
213 Gray, ‘The Choice Between Restitution and Compensation’ (n 34) 422. According to 
Marotti/Palchetti, the Court’s approach in the case was consistent with the secondary rules on state 
responsibility concerning the consequences of an internationally wrongful act, as articulated in the 
ARSIWA. Additionally, in their opinion the judgment has illustrated the significance of 
maintaining the flexibility of the aforementioned secondary rules, as well as the importance of the 
Court’s utilization of such flexibility to arrive to a solution that fits best the circumstances of each 
case. See Marotti/Palchetti (n 47). Cf, however, Crawford in Essays Vukas (n 197) 694, where he 
argues that the amount of compensation due to each party would likely have been different as the 
acts for which each party was internationally responsible were of different nature and character. 
214 M Shaw, ‘The International Court, Responsibility and Remedies’ M Fitzmaurice/D Sarooshi 
(eds), Issues of State Responsibility Before International Judicial Institutions (Hart 2004) 19–34, 
30.  
	 56	
b. The PCIJ practice 
According to Gray, during the PCIJ years one third of the cases brought to the Court 
included a claim for the award of monetary compensation (‘damages’).215 However, 
monetary compensation was awarded only once, in the SS Wimbledon case.216 In that case, 
an English ship (the ‘Wimbledon’) chartered by a French company carrying military 
material and heading to Danzig, was refused passage through the Kiel Canal by Germany. 
The refusal was based on German neutrality laws and connected to the ongoing war 
between Poland and Russia. The French government protested to the German government 
regarding the prohibition of passage and the detainment of the ship under Article 380 of 
the Treaty of Versailles217. The German government insisted upon its position, while 
following its release the ship headed to Danzig through a different route. The incident was 
followed by unsuccessful diplomatic negotiations and the dispute was brought before the 
PCIJ as provided for under Article 386 of the Treaty of Versailles. The PCIJ found that 
indeed the refusal of Germany to allow passage of Wimbledon through the Kiel Canal was 
wrongful and thus it was responsible for the damage sustained and had to compensate 
France on behalf of their national company that had chartered the ship.218 Notably the 
Court while assessing the amount of compensation due, it concluded that the head of 
damages regarding loss of profit incurred because of the contribution that the detained 
vessel would have otherwise had to the general expenses of the company was not 
acceptable as ‘[t]he expenses in question [were] not connected with the refusal of 
passage.’219 The Court awarded compensation of the amount of 140,749.35 francs plus 
interest to be paid by Germany. Eventually, however, the Reparation Commission 
established under Article 233 of the Treaty of Versailles did not allow the payment to go 
forward.220  
The SS Wimbledon case is notable with respect to the award of a remedy in the form of 
compensation and its assessment because of the very limited discussion of the matter in the 																																																								
215 Gray, Judicial Remedies (n 46) 77. 
216 SS Wimbledon, PCIJ, Series A, No 1, 15. 
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decision of the Court.221 The Court accepted the valuation of the applicant regarding the 
damage suffered for the heads of damages not contested by the respondent, and rejected 
the ones that it found were not connected with the refusal of passage (and had also been 
contested by the respondent). It hardly then spelled out any principles applicable to such 
assessment, or a reflection on the heads of damages acceptable.222  
As mentioned, compensation was claimed in many of the other cases brought to the PCIJ 
albeit never awarded. The only other time that the Court came really close to awarding 
compensation was the Chorzów Factory already mentioned.223 As we have seen already, in 
this case the Court discussed in detail the obligation to make reparation as a consequence 
of an internationally wrongful act, its different forms and the principles applicable to it. 
The relevant passages from the Court’s judgment have been quoted in length in Chapters II 
and III of this dissertation. It is probably because of the Court’s spelling out of the rules 
and principles governing the duty to make reparation, that the relevant passages from the 
judgment are the most often-quoted ones whenever a tribunal or legal scholarship grapples 
with the issue of reparations. The case was eventually settled however and the Court never 
got the chance to proceed to the actual assessment of the compensation due.224 
c. The ICJ practice 
The practice of the present World Court when it comes to the obligation to make 
reparation, and in particular awarding compensation, is equally scarce. In the past 70 years 
the Court has awarded monetary compensation only three times; in its very first case, the 
Corfu Channel, in the Ahmadou Sadio Diallo case in 2012, and recently in the case 
concerning Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area in February 
2018. There are, however, a few cases currently pending before the Court that may end up 
in an award of reparations. These include among others the continuation of the Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo case,225 as well as the cases brought before the 
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Court by Iran against the US.226 Hence, the topic of reparations will acquire bigger 
significance over the next few years and deserves detailed study and consideration. Given 
the slightly different focus of the present thesis only a brief overview of the Court’s 
practice in awarding remedies in the form of monetary compensation will be attempted 
here. 
Corfu Channel,227 the very first case that came before the Court was also the only case in 
which the Court had awarded monetary compensation for a long time. It was also a case 
that involved a situation of ‘shared responsibility’ as defined in Chapter III above. For 
reasons of clarity and structure, the issues of the judgment pertaining to matters of shared 
responsibility will not be analysed in this section, but in section 4 below. Here, we will 
only (as far as possible) grapple with the matters pertaining to the practice of the Court in 
the award of compensation as a form of reparation. 
The events that led to the case are known among international lawyers and will not be 
repeated here at length. Briefly, in October 1946 two British warships crossing the Corfu 
Channel struck mines which exploded and caused extensive damage to the vessels, loss of 
life and physical injuries. After discussions in the UN Security Council, the UK brought 
the case to the Court by means of a unilateral application. Following a jurisdictional phase 
in the proceedings, in which Albania raised preliminary objections but the Court found that 
it had jurisdiction to adjudicate the case,228 the parties concluded a special agreement (a 
compromis) and asked the Court to adjudicate two questions: First, whether Albania had 
responsibility for the explosions and the resulting damage and whether there was a duty to 
pay compensation for the damage caused. Second, whether the UK had violated Albania’s 
sovereignty by crossing Albanian waters without authorization in October 1946 and by 
subsequently sending UK ships to a mine-sweeping operation in Albanian waters in 
November 1946, and whether it had therefore an obligation to provide satisfaction as a 
means of making reparation.229 In the merits, the Court concluded that mines belonging to 
a minefield later found in Albanian waters had caused the damage to the British ships.230 In 																																																								
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that respect, the Court accepted that Albania could not have laid the mines itself and that 
there was no evidence to prove collusion in laying the mines between Albania and any 
third party. Albania’s international responsibility was instead engaged because the mines 
could not have been laid in its territorial waters without its knowledge, given the available 
evidence and all the circumstances of the case.231 Given its knowledge Albania had the 
obligation to notify about the existence of the minefield, ‘for the benefit of shipping in 
general’, and to warn the approaching British vessels about the minefield.232 Having 
violated these obligations, Albania had international responsibility for the explosions and 
an obligation to pay compensation for the damage caused as a result.233 The Court then 
found that it had competence to assess the amount of compensation due, but that separate 
proceedings were necessary for that determination.234 Albania subsequently did not 
participate in this separate phase of the proceedings for the assessment of compensation as 
it contested the Court’s jurisdiction on the matter. The Court entrusted the assessment of 
the heads of damages and of the various amounts submitted by the UK to an expert 
Commission of Inquiry as provided for under Article 50 of the Statute.235  It finally 
accepted the experts’ report which largely concurred with the amounts of damages 
requested by the UK and awarded to the latter compensation of £843,947.236 Notably, it did 
not delve into a discussion of the relevant matters itself nor did it elucidate the rules and 
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principles applicable to causation, when it comes to omissions, or to the valuation of the 
damage sustained as a result.237  
More than 60 years later, in Ahmadou Sadio Diallo the Court awarded monetary 
compensation again in what can be characterized as a classical diplomatic protection case. 
Guinea filed an application to the Court against the Congo for gross violations of human 
rights committed against its national by the respondent State in the latter’s territory. More 
specifically, Guinea alleged that through the illegal arrest, detention, and subsequent 
expulsion of Diallo, Congo had violated its obligations under international human rights 
law238 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,239 and had thus international 
responsibility and the obligation to make reparation for the material and moral damage 
caused to the individual in the form of compensation and satisfaction. The Court found that 
the Congo had indeed violated its international human rights obligations under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights240 and the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights241 by illegally arresting, detaining, and expelling Diallo, as well as 
under Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. For these reasons, 
it concluded that Congo had to make reparation to Guinea for the injury suffered and that 
in view of the fundamental character of human rights obligations, reparation had to take 
the form of compensation apart from a judicial finding of the violations (which the Court 
seemed to consider a form of satisfaction).242 The Court deferred the determination of such 
compensation to a separate phase of the proceedings to allow the Parties to reach a 
negotiated solution.243 When negotiations failed Guinea re-approached the Court which 
eventually rendered its decision on compensation in 2012.244 To fix the amount of 
compensation the Court started from the principles enunciated by the PCIJ in the Chórzow 
Factory case, as well as the practice of other international courts and tribunals in applying 
these general principles. In particular, the Court looked at the caselaw of those courts that 																																																								
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238 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v DRC) Merits, Judgment [2010] ICJ Rep 639, 662, 
para 63. 
239 Ibid; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (24 April 1963) 596 UNTS 261. 
240 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171. 
241 27 June 1981, 1520 UNTS 217. 
242 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v DRC) Merits, Judgment [2010] ICJ Rep 639, 691, 
para 161. 
243 Ibid para 163–64.  
244 Ibid, Compensation, Judgment [2012] ICJ Rep 324. 
	 61	
had extensively dealt with injuries due to unlawful detention and expulsion.245 Spelling out 
its approach to fixing the compensation due the Court stated that it had to first examine 
whether an injury had been established under each head of damages claimed by Guinea, 
and then whether such injury was the result of the internationally wrongful act of the 
Congo.246 In that respect, the Court had to ascertain whether ‘there [was] a sufficiently 
direct and certain causal nexus between the wrongful act and the injury suffered’ by the 
applicant, as it had concluded in the Bosnian Genocide case.247 As we will later see the 
issue of the causal link in Bosnian Genocide was instrumental to the allocation of the 
obligation to make reparation among multiple responsible actors. According to the Court, 
only if the injury and the causal link were established it would then turn to the issue of 
valuation.248 
According to the Court, the non-material injury was ‘an inevitable consequence’ of the 
internationally wrongful acts of the DRC and it was ‘reasonable to conclude’ that these 
actions had caused moral damage to Mr Diallo in the form of ‘significant psychological 
suffering and loss of reputation’.249 In that respect assessment of compensation for ‘non-
material injury necessarily rests on equitable considerations’ as confirmed by the case law 
of other international tribunals, especially human rights courts.250 In light of these 
considerations, the Court proceeded to set the amount of compensation for non-material 
damage, admittedly quite arbitrarily,251 to the amount of US$85,000.252 In terms of the 
material injury suffered by the victim, the Court found that the evidence offered by the 
Applicant failed to establish that the damage was of the amount claimed. The Court 
however recognized that Congo’s actions must have caused ‘some material damage’ to Mr 
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Diallo with respect to loss of personal property, and so awarded compensation of 
US$10,000 based on equitable considerations.253 The amount of compensation awarded for 
material damage to Guinea constituted but a tiny fraction of the amount requested. It is 
striking in all this that the Court did not feel the need to articulate the principles applicable 
to the valuation of compensation and based its findings purely on ‘equitable 
considerations’. Additionally, one cannot but observe that the Court very quickly bypassed 
the issue of causation between the internationally wrongful acts and the non-material 
injury suffered by the victim and plainly assumed that such injury must have been 
sustained given the nature of the violations.  
Finally, in the most recent case that it has awarded compensation, the Certain Activities 
Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area,254 the Court had to deal with complex 
scientific issues concerning the assessment of environmental damage. The case arose from 
a complaint brought before the Court by Costa Rica for breach of its territorial integrity 
and conduct of unlawful activities, including military occupation and the creation of a 
channel by unlawfully dredging the San Juan River, by Nicaragua within its territory.255 
Subsequently, Nicaragua also filed an application to the Court alleging that Costa Rica had 
violated its obligations under international law by constructing a road along the San Juan 
River including in part along its border with Nicaragua without conducting the requisite 
environmental impact assessment, causing as a result grave environmental damage.256 The 
Court decided to join the proceedings in the two cases as this would allow it to better 
appreciate the many complex and interrelated issues involved.257 In the merits the Court 
found that Nicaragua had international responsibility for having breached Costa Rican 
territory by conducting unlawful activities in such territory, including excavating channels 
and stationing military personnel, and had thus the obligation to make reparation for the 
damage caused as a result. As regards the unlawfulness of the dredging activities that 
Nicaragua had conducted and which allegedly had caused damage to Costa Rican territory, 																																																								
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the Court found that the causal link between the reduction in flow of the Colorado River 
and Nicaragua’s dredging activities had not been established. According to the Court, other 
factors, including decreased rainfall, ‘may [have] be[en] relevant to the decrease in 
flow’,258 and in any event the diversion of water was far from significant to cause harm to 
Costa Rican territory.259 It also found that Nicaragua’s conduct had breached the 2011 
Provisional Measures order, as well as Costa Rica’s navigational rights in the San Juan 
River. In terms of Costa Rica’s request that Nicaragua make reparation for the damage 
caused, the Court held that the declarations concerning Nicaragua’s breach of its 
international obligations provided satisfaction for the non-material injury as had been 
requested by Costa Rica. It determined that additionally Costa-Rica was entitled to receive 
compensation for the material damage caused to its territory by the unlawful conduct of 
Nicaragua, but that the extent of the damage and the amount of compensation were to be 
assessed in separate proceedings (as both parties had requested), if the Parties had not 
reached agreement on the matter within 12 months of the handing down of the decision.260 
In the case against Costa Rica, the Court found that the respondent had violated it 
obligation under international law to conduct an environmental impact assessment prion to 
commencing construction activities.261 However, it found that Costa Rica had not breached 
its obligation under customary international law to not cause significant transboundary 
harm in Nicaragua’s territory as Nicaragua had not adduced sufficient evidence to establish 
that significant harm had been caused due to the construction of the road.262 For this 
reason, it determined that the appropriate form of reparation for Nicaragua was satisfaction 
in the form of a declaration that Costa Rica had breached its obligation to conduct an 
environmental impact assessment. The Court did not grant restitution or compensation as it 
had found that no significant harm had been caused to Nicaraguan territory because of the 
construction of the road and that Costa Rica had not breached any of its substantive 
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obligations under international law.263 On that note it is interesting that the Court took for 
granted that there was no damage to be compensated at all after having found that there 
was no breach of the substantive obligations of Costa Rica under customary and 
conventional international law. But this is not necessarily true in view of the fact that the 
violation of the obligation to conduct an environmental impact assessment may have 
caused some financially assessable damage to be compensated despite the fact that the 
damage may not have been ‘significant’ enough to reach the threshold of breaching the 
substantive obligations. This is just one point that reveals the intricacies of the concept of 
damage for the purposes of international responsibility and the obligation to make 
reparation as a remedy as well as the complex evidentiary issues involved. 
Following the breakdown of negotiations Costa Rica filed a request to the Court for the 
determination of said compensation due, which the Court eventually set at the amount of 
US$378,890.59 (including pre-judgment interest) which was substantially lower than the 
amount requested by Costa Rica (US$6,711,685.26 plus pre-judgment interest at the 
amount of US$501,997.28). To decide on the proper amount of compensation the Court 
reverted to its statement in Ahmadou Sadio Diallo that it had to determine ‘whether there is 
a sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus between the wrongful act … and the injury 
suffered by the Applicant’.264 It then recognised in a dictum highly relevant for the 
purposes of the present inquiry that in cases of environmental damage establishing damage 
and causation can be particularly problematic as  
[t]he damage may be due to several concurrent causes, or the state of science 
regarding the causal link between the wrongful act and the damage may be 
uncertain. These are difficulties that must be addressed as and when they arise in 
light of the facts of the case at hand and the evidence presented to the Court. 
																																																								
263 Ibid p 739, para 226. 
264 Judgment of 2 February 2018, para 32. However, the Court did not elaborate on what would 
constitute a ‘sufficiently direct and certain causal link’ in the context of environmental damages. 
See also D Desierto, ‘Environmental Damages, Environmental Reparations, and the Right to a 
Healthy Environment: The ICJ Compensation Judgment in Costa Rica v. Nicaragua and the 
IACtHR Advisory Opinion on Marine Protection for the Great Caribbean’, EJIL:Talk!, 14 
February 2018, available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/environmental-damages-environmental-
reparations-and-the-right-to-a-healthy-environment-the-icj-compensation-judgment-in-costa-rica-
v-nicaragua-and-the-iacthr-advisory-opinion-on-marine-protection/. 
	 65	
Ultimately, it is for the Court to decide whether there is a sufficient causal nexus 
between the wrongful act and the injury suffered.265 
In that respect the Court asserted that even though in certain cases the valuation of material 
damage may be particularly difficult due to lack of evidence, that does not always preclude 
the possibility of the award of compensation. The Court may in these cases award 
compensation on the basis of equitable consideration as it did in the Diallo case.266 In the 
present case, the Court recognized that environmental damage is indeed compensable and 
in conformity with the principle of full reparation this includes both damage to the 
environment as such and the costs incurred by the injured State as a result.267 However, the 
Court made sure to highlight that there is no single valuation method for assessing 
compensation for environmental damage in international law and ‘it is necessary…to take 
into account the specific circumstances and characteristics of each case’.268 In doing that 
the Court would be guided by the more general principles applicable to the obligation to 
make reparation under the law of international responsibility, ie the Chorzów Factory 
principles, ‘full reparation’, the need for the existence of a ‘sufficiently direct and certain 
causal link’, the fact that the existence of concurrent causes does not necessarily preclude 
the award of compensation, and the operation of ‘equitable considerations’.269 In the end, 
the Court awarded Costa Rica an amount far lower than the one requested partly as a result 
of lack of a causal link between the damage and Nicaragua’s internationally wrongful 
conduct and partly because Costa Rica had failed to meet its burden of proof concerning 
certain heads of damages. The overall reasoning of the Court as well as the valuation 
methodology employed and the manner of inquiry into scientific evidence in the judgment 
were quite opaque in some respects and not particularly reasoned.270 The Court could have 
definitely made use of scientific experts to assist it in assessing the damage caused to the 
environment by the unlawful activities of Nicaragua as well as explain further the 
applicable rules and principles concerning causation and damage in environmental 
disputes. 
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Overall, we can conclude from the cases examined in this section that the Court takes a 
case- and context-specific approach to the award of compensation, to the assessment of 
damage and to the existence of the necessary causal link. Its general approach towards 
remedies seems to be flexible and as far as possible it tends to avoid getting into complex 
factual, evidentiary, and scientific questions when it comes to concretizing the obligation 
to make reparation.  
3. The broader jurisdictional setting of the Court and its relevance for cases 
involving multiple responsible actors 
The analysis will now turn to the wider jurisdictional setting as this is another instrumental 
factor that will assist us in appreciating the manner in which the Court deals with situations 
involving multiple responsible actors and their obligation to make reparation.  
International dispute settlement is based before and above all on the principle of 
consent.271 This holds true for the Court and its predecessor,272 for international arbitration 
proceedings, either inter-State or investor-State, for human rights courts, for ITLOS and so 
forth. Under Article 36 of the Statute the Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate on disputes 
brought before it by one of the means stipulated therein. Its competence to pronounce upon 
the factual and legal issues is delimited by the jurisdictional title at hand and the non ultra 
petita rule.273 This need not necessarily present particular problems in cases involving 
multiple responsible actors from a substantive point of view. However, and given that from 
a procedural perspective only one of the responsible States will be present before the Court 
for the resolution of the dispute, this will essentially restrict the approach that the latter can 
take when deciding the matter. Because of the strict confines of the principle of consent the 
Court is far more likely to take a problem-solving approach entertaining only the particular 
issues necessary for the resolution of the dispute before it, as it regularly does, rather than 
venture into assessing the overall context involving possible other States and substantive 
matters that are not included in the jurisdictional title.274 This will in turn promote a 
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flexible, case-specific approach resolving the matter for the parties before it and hinder the 
articulation of any general rule aiming at capturing the entirety of the dispute. 
Additionally, in terms of access to the Court, only States parties to the Statute, can bring 
their disputes before the Court in contentious proceedings.275 Hence, if an actor is not a 
State but rather an international organization, a multinational corporation, or a private 
individual she would have no standing before the Court. As we saw in Chapter III often 
actors other than States have also contributed to the same injury for the purposes of the 
obligation to make reparation. In this case, even if some of them may bear responsibility 
under international law for the violation that contributed to the injury, the Court will not 
have power to pronounce upon their responsibility and consequently upon their obligation 
to make reparation. This was for example the case in Bosnian Genocide as we will later 
see. The Court’s reach in this respect is essentially limited by the fact that it is only 
empowered to adjudicate on the rights and obligations of States that come before it.276  
In terms of structure the procedure of the Court is evidently based on a bilateralised 
approach to dispute settlement and inter-State relations.277 This is apparent from the 
scarcity of provisions in the Statute and the Rules of Court that make it possible to 
accommodate multilateral disputes, as well as by the limited practice of the Court in 
applying them. For instance, cases are hardly ever joined in proceedings even if the matters 
addressed in them are of very similar nature or stem from the same factual or legal 
background.278 The institution of intervention has been used very few times by States and 
has even fewer ones been accepted by the Court.279 This necessarily affects the substantive 
manner in which the Court will approach any given case involving multiple responsible 
States or actors as it will seek to resolve the dispute before it confined by this bilateral 
perspective. 
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Finally, of particular importance for the purposes of our inquiry is the indispensable third 
party principle, otherwise known as the Monetary Gold principle.280 The principle was first 
applied by the Court in the Monetary Gold Removed From Rome case and leads to a 
refusal of the Court to exercise its jurisdiction when the legal interests of a State not a party 
to the dispute before the Court ‘form the very subject-matter of the decision’.281 The 
principle following that first case and although it has been invoked quite a few times as an 
objection to the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the case, it has only been 
subsequently applied by the Court once, in the East Timor case.282 Hence, its practical 
importance might seemingly be quite limited. More importantly, the Court rejected in the 
Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, as we will see in the next section, the argument that 
the principle constituted an obstacle to its adjudication of the dispute even though the 
responsibility of multiple States was potentially at stake. Fontanelli, commenting on the 
(non-)application of the indispensable third party principle in the recent Norstar case 
before ITLOS accurately identifies the implications that it may have in particular for 
situations of aid or assistance.283 Paparinskis attempting to construct the principle so as not 
to hinder the Court from entertaining cases involving multiple responsible actors, argues 
that most cases of shared responsibility could be implemented within the ‘four corners’ of 
the rule, but that sometimes ‘the objection may prove insurmountable’.284 This is 
especially true when issues of remedies and enforcement constitute part of the petitum and 
the claims presented to the Court.285 
Hence, we can fairly non-controversially conclude that cases involving more than one 
parties either as applicants or as respondents cannot be easily accommodated by the 
Court’s jurisdictional setting as envisaged under its Statute and the Rules of Procedure. 
States coming to the Court have often themselves recognized as much. For example, Israel 																																																								
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in the Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 case,286 stated in its written pleadings that given that 
the UK and the US had also brought proceedings against Bulgaria the three governments 
had sought to coordinate their claims ‘to prevent so far as was possible the Bulgarian 
Government being faced with double claims, leading to the possibility of double 
damages’.287 As explained above the prohibition of double recovery is one of the basic 
tenets of the obligation to make reparation under the law of international responsibility.  
4. Interim Conclusions 
All this is not meant to assert that it will be procedurally impossible for the Court to 
adjudicate cases involving multiple responsible actors. It is rather meant to reveal that 
certain peculiarities and particularities inherent in the nature of international dispute 
settlement, will necessarily affect the manner that the Court handles such cases and in 
particular the award of remedies and the allocation of the obligation to make reparation. 
The foregoing analysis reveals that any rule on the allocation of the obligation to make 
reparation among multiple responsible actors would need to be situated within the broader 
approach of the Court towards remedies. The Court’s approach with respect to remedies 
has been generally characterized by flexibility288 or—viewed from another perspective—
‘pragmatic, unselfconscious, and somewhat unreflective’ creativity.289 Additionally, 
despite the fact that rules on reparation and remedies cannot be strictly considered as part 
of the procedure of the Court and rather fall squarely within the realm of secondary rules 
on state responsibility,290 the particular jurisdictional and procedural setting plays a major 
role in their realization. For one, evidentiary rules will be instrumental on whether damage, 
its extent and circumstances can be established. The general reluctance of the Court to 
actively engage in the gathering of evidence and the establishment of the facts would 
essentially affect the manner in which the Court may deal with damage that has been 
caused by contributions of different actors.291 This is so for the simple reason that available 
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evidence will be crucial in establishing the involvement of the various actors as well as 
factual causation between each one’s wrongful conduct and the resulting damage.  
For its part, the principle of consent and that of the indispensable third party as well as the 
power of the Court to entertain cases in which only States are parties will necessarily shape 
the manner that the Court deals with situations of shared responsibility. Cases such as 
Corfu Channel, Nauru, and Bosnian Genocide illustrate the point quite well. As 
demonstrated in section 3 above these observations do not necessarily mean that the Court 
will be prevented from looking at these situations or from allocating responsibility and its 
consequences, including the obligation to make reparation. However, when it comes to 
remedies and reparation, particularly compensation, one should be cautious in trying to 
adduce and establish general principles, taking into consideration the Court’s cautious, 
flexible, and case-specific approach. According to Brownlie this was one of the main 
takeaways from the Court’s decision in the Corfu Channel case.292 The final chapter of this 
thesis will study the cases in which the Court has had the chance to grapple with situations 
involving multiple responsible actors so far. Following that, it will assess whether the case 
law of other international courts and tribunals in similar situations confirms the practice of 
the Court with respect to the allocation of the obligation to make reparation among 
multiple responsible actors. 
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V. Reparation in cases involving multiple responsible actors at 
the ICJ and beyond 
1. The Practice of the ICJ 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the first case in which the ICJ awarded monetary 
compensation, Corfu Channel, was also a case involving multiple responsible actors. The 
Court found Albania responsible for the injury caused to the UK despite acknowledging 
that ‘the authors of the minelaying remain[ed] unknown’.293 The finding was based on the 
fact that in view of the evidence at the disposal of the Court Albania could not not have 
known about the minelaying in its territorial waters. This finding evidently contradicted the 
emphatic statement of the Court that ‘it cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the 
control exercised by a State over its territory and waters that the State necessarily knew, or 
ought to have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein, nor yet that it necessarily 
knew, or should have known, the authors’.294 Nonetheless, given its (inferred) knowledge 
the Court concluded that Albania had violated its own primary obligations independently 
from internationally wrongful act of any third party that did the actual minelaying. The 
primary obligations that bound Albania and were breached were according to the Court 
based on ‘certain general and well-recognised principles, namely: elementary 
considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war; the principle of the 
freedom of maritime communication; and every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly 
its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.’295 Aside from the fact 
that as we mentioned earlier there has been discontent with the basically non-existent 
discussion on the Court’s part of the relevant causation principles and the assessment of 
damages, we observe that by identifying a self-standing primary obligation binding the 
respondent before it and by applying the rule of independent responsibility the Court 
managed to hold Albania accountable for the injury suffered by the UK. 
In the Tehran Hostages case,296 the matters were somewhat more complicated as the 
damage to the applicant had been caused by the combined actions of the respondent State 
and a group of non-state actors; the latter not being responsible for their actions under 
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international law. The case arose out of the events that took place in Tehran in from 4 
November 1979 onwards when amidst the Iranian revolution a group of militants and 
students invaded and occupied the US embassy compound in Tehran as well as two US 
consulates, took hostages diplomatic personnel and private US citizens and destroyed 
diplomatic property.297 The US filed an application to the Court alleging that by 
permitting, encouraging, tolerating and by failing to prevent and punish such conduct Iran 
had violated its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations298 and 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations as well as under the 1955 Treaty of 
Amity299, that it had to immediately release all the hostages and seize all wrongful conduct 
and also had the obligation to make reparation for the injuries sustained. The central 
question in the case was whether Iran as a State had international responsibility for the 
actions and the damage caused by the actions of the non-state actors that carried out the 
invasion and occupation of the embassy, ie whether the acts of the latter were ‘imputable 
to the Iranian State’.300 According to the Court the pertinent events fell in two different 
phases. The first one was the attack to the US embassy on 4 November 1979 performed by 
the militant and students group, the destruction and damaged caused thereof, the taking of 
hostages and the occupation of the embassy.301 Although these actions could not as such be 
attributed to the Iranian State,302 the latter had still violated its international obligations 
under the two Vienna Conventions and the Treaty of Amity by not taking ‘appropriate 
steps’ to safeguard the inviolability of diplomatic and consular premises, their property, 
archives and documents, and the safety and inviolability of the person of diplomatic and 
consular staff as well as of private US citizens.303 The second phase consisting of the 
espousal of the militants’ action by the Iranian State which vested it with ‘the seal of 
official governmental approval’304 and led to the conduct being attributable to the Iranian 
State as a result and to additional violations of the aforementioned international 
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conventions and established rules of general international law.305 For all these violations, 
the Court concluded that Iran incurred international responsibility and had to make 
reparation for the injury caused to the US, but the form and amount of reparation had to be 
determined in separate proceedings.306 What is particularly interesting for our purposes is 
that Iran was held responsible to make reparation for the injury caused to the US ‘by the 
events of 4 November 1979 and what followed from these events’.307 This is quite 
unproblematic for the events of the ‘second phase’ that were attributable to the Iranian 
State by means of the approval of the actions of the militants as this is a clear case of the 
operation of the principle of independent responsibility. As long as the damage caused to 
the US was due to the actions attributable to Iran and constituted simultaneously violation 
of its international obligations, Iran had international responsibility and the obligation to 
make reparation. However, it is not as readily clear why Iran was called to make reparation 
also for the events of the ‘first phase’ when the actions of the militants, which were the 
ones that physically caused the damage to the US, were not imputable to Iran. During this 
‘first phase’ Iran had international responsibility for violating its own international 
obligations under the Vienna Conventions and the Treaty of Amity to take the ‘necessary 
steps’ to safeguard and protect the inviolability of the diplomatic and consular premises as 
well as the safety and inviolability of the person of diplomatic and consular personnel as 
well as of private US citizens. However, the Court seemed to assume that the failure of 
Iran to observe its international obligations in that respect was equally connected in terms 
of causation to the damage sustained by the US. For that damage then Iran was obliged to 
make reparation. The case was later discontinued following the conclusion of the Algiers 
Accords and the establishment of the US-Iran Claims Tribunal308 and so the Court never 
had the chance to pronounce on the appropriate form of reparation and to assess the 
amount of compensation due. However, we observe here an application of the rule 
identified by the ILC that despite the existence of concurrent causes, responsibility is not 
attenuated merely due to the fact that another cause has contributed to the damage.309 The 
responsible State bears international responsibility for its own conduct that has contributed 
to the damage and has thus an obligation to make reparation in full for the injury caused, 
notwithstanding the fact that the damage might not even have occurred had it not been for 
the conduct of another actor. In fact, in the Tehran Hostages case, that other actor did not 
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even bear responsibility under international law for the actions that led to the damage, 
although the militants may indeed have violated domestic criminal law with their actions. 
Still through this rule as well as by clearly identifying the obligations of Iran under 
relevant international conventions the Court managed to hold Iran responsible for the 
entirety of the injury sustained by the US, although certain questions regarding the causal 
link between the internationally wrongful actions of Iran in the ‘first phase’ of events and 
the damaged sustained thereof remained. 
The Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru case is the case that has most closely grappled with 
some of the jurisdictional issues outlined in the previous chapter. Nauru following 
independence brought proceedings to the Court against Australia, one of the three State 
that ‘jointly’ constituted the Administering Authority of Nauru as a Trusteeship territory. 
The other two States, New Zealand and the UK, were not parties to the proceedings before 
the Court. Australia argued that the case was inadmissible and there was no jurisdiction of 
the Court as any determination of Australia’s international responsibility and its obligation 
to make reparation would necessary implicate the responsibility of two parties that had not 
consented to the Court’s jurisdiction.310 This was a clear invocation of the indispensable 
third party principle as enunciated in the Monetary Gold case. It is notable in that respect 
that to the years preceding the commencement of proceedings officials of Nauru had 
invoked the responsibility of all three governments to make reparation for the damage 
caused to the island’s phosphate resources.311 To resolve this matter, the Court examined 
the nature and conditions of the mandate that had been granted to the UK, Australia and 
New Zealand under the League of Nations system and was in 1947 transformed into a 
Trusteeship under the UN Charter. The Court observed that during the Mandate the 
Administrator General of Nauru had always been appointed by Australia and thus received 
instructions by the Australian government. The other two States were informed about his 
decisions but they did not have any influence over them. The same system continued under 
the Trusteeship with Australia having the predominant role over the administration of the 
territory.312 In light of these circumstances the Court concluded that the three countries 
‘constituted… the “Administering Authority”’, that the latter ‘did not have an international 
legal personality distinct’ from those of the three States, and the Australia played a ‘very 
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special role’ as established under the relevant international agreements and ‘by practice’.313 
In the Court’s view Australia’s objection about the admissibility of the case had two 
aspects. The first one concerned the nature of the responsibility involved. Australia argued 
that as the administration of Nauru had been performed by the three States jointly any 
claim concerning such administration had to be brought against all three States jointly, and 
not any of them individually. Australia also raised the issue whether  
the liability of the three States would be “joint and several” (solidaire) so that any 
one of the three would be liable to make full reparation for the damage flowing 
from any breach of the obligations of the Administration Authority or whether each 
State was responsible only for a part, and not merely a one-third or some other 
proportionate share.314 
The Court disposed of this aspect of the objection quickly as it considered the matter to be 
one for the merits of the case with no effect on whether any one of the three parties could 
be sued independently.315  
The second aspect of Australia’s objection was according to the Court one related to the 
Monetary Gold principle as Australia claimed that any determination of her international 
responsibility would necessarily simultaneously constitute a determination of the 
international responsibility of the UK and New Zealand, and that would be contrary to the 
fundamental principle of consent upon which the Court’s jurisdiction is founded.316 
Reviewing its jurisprudence concerning the indispensable third party principle the Court 
stated that it was not precluded to adjudicate on the responsibility of a State by the mere 
fact that its decision might have implications for the legal position of States that are not 
party to the proceedings so far as the rights and obligations of the latter do not constitute 
the ‘very subject matter’ of the dispute.317 The absent States are in any event protected 
under Article 59 of the Statute. It then concluded that the interests of the UK and New 
Zealand would not form the ‘very subject matter’ of the dispute as the situation was quite 
different from the one in the Monetary Gold case, as there was no need to make any 
findings upon the responsibility of the two States in order to make a finding concerning the 
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responsibility of Australia.318 However, the Court made sure to highlight that this 
determination had no impact on the manner that the obligation to make reparation was to 
be allocated, which was an issue for the merits.319 In that respect, if Australia had been 
found responsible, reparation would have to be determined in light of the features of the 
Mandate and the Trusteeship as well as the special role that Australia had played in the 
administration of the territory.320 The Court found that it had jurisdiction and that the case 
was for its biggest part admissible, but never got a chance to decide on the merits as the 
parties settled the dispute and the case was discontinued.321 Notably, Australia agreed in 
the settlement to pay compensation to Nauru equal to the entirety of its claim. 
The fourth case to be examined in this section is Bosnian Genocide. This case is 
particularly pertinent to our analysis as it was characterized by extensive 
interconnectedness of actions between Serbia and the various non-state actors, in the form 
of paramilitary groups that committed numerous crimes under international humanitarian 
and human rights law during the conflict. The tragic events during and after the dissolution 
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that led to the case before the Court are 
well known and will not be repeated here. So are the jurisdictional complications relating 
to state succession and the various phases of the proceedings before the eventual decision 
in the merits.322 In the 2007 judgment the Court found Serbia responsible among others for 
failure to prevent the commission of genocide in Srebrenica in violation of its obligations 
under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide323 but 
not for having committed genocide in Srebrenica nor for having been complicit in the 
commission of such genocide or for having incited or conspired to commit genocide.324 
There are two points in the Court’s reasoning that are highly relevant to our inquiry. 
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First, examining the issue of complicity to the commission of genocide under Article III of 
the Genocide Convention, the Court turned to Article 16 ARSIWA which it characterized 
as reflective of customary international law.325 The Court asserted that Article 16 could 
provide guidance even in situations that did not involve multiple responsible States but 
rather a State and non-state actors.326 This illustrates that despite the fact that the rules in 
ARSIWA have to their largest part been formulated with inter-State relations in mind, they 
can accommodate other types of situations too if they are reasonably and clearly applied. 
However, the Court could not find Serbia responsible for having aided or assisted non-state 
actors in the commission of genocide as it could not be established that Serbia acted 
knowingly, ie aware of the dolus specialis of the principal perpetrators of genocide, as 
required for the commission of the crime under international law. 
Second, discussing the obligation to prevent genocide under Article I of the Genocide 
Convention, the Court stated: 
the obligation in question is one of conduct and not of result, in the sense that a 
State cannot be under an obligation to succeed, whatever the circumstances, in 
preventing the commission of genocide; the obligation of State parties is rather to 
employ all means reasonably available to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as 
possible… the notion of ‘due diligence’, which calls for an assessment in concreto, 
is of critical importance. 
It added that in order for a State to have violated its obligation to prevent genocide, 
genocide has to have actually been committed.327 Hence, the Court in fact considered as a 
necessary prerequisite for the violation of the obligation by the State that some other 
actor—a concurrent cause—would have committed the genocidal acts. For the Court, this 
was the manner that all obligations of prevention operate.328 Given the circumstances of 
the case and the available evidence, the Court concluded that Serbia had indeed 
international responsibility for failure to prevent the commission of genocide.329 
When it came to the obligation to make reparation as a consequence of such international 
responsibility, the Court in line with its usual practice turned to the Chórzow Factory 																																																								
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principles and stated that in the circumstances of the case restitutio in integrum was not 
appropriate but the declaration that Serbia had violated its obligation under the Genocide 
Convention to prevent genocide was ‘appropriate satisfaction’.330 However, with respect to 
the Applicant’s claim for compensation the matter was more complicated. As the Court 
had found that Serbia had not itself committed genocide, nor had it been complicit in such 
commission of genocide and so forth, it had to establish whether ‘the injury asserted by the 
Applicant [was] the consequence of wrongful conduct by the Respondent, with the 
consequence that the Respondent should be required to make reparation for it’.331 That was 
a matter of the causal link between the actual commission of genocide in Srebrenica and 
Serbia’s failure to ‘employ all means in its possession’ to prevent such genocide. 
According to the Court the question was whether there was ‘a sufficiently direct and 
certain causal nexus between the wrongful act, the Respondent’s breach of the obligation 
to prevent genocide, and the injury suffered by the Applicant’.332 And in that respect, the 
Court felt that it was not able to conclude from the overall circumstances of the case that 
genocide would not have occurred had Serbia employed ‘all means in its possession’ to 
prevent it, and thus the Respondent was under no obligation to pay compensation from the 
material and non-material damage resulting from the commission of genocide.333 In the 
words of the Court ‘financial compensation [was] not the appropriate form of reparation 
for the breach of the obligation to prevent genocide’.334 
Hence, although the Court found a way to hold Serbia responsible for her omission to 
prevent the commission of genocide through an examination and articulation of the its 
primary obligations independently from the actual commission of the crime by non-state 
actors, the somewhat muddled application of the test of causation prevented it from 
awarding compensation and to a certain extent from realizing the remedial function of 
reparation for the victims of genocide.335 
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2. The Practice of Other Courts and Tribunals 
Having this admittedly scarce practice of the Court in mind, the analysis will now turn to 
the practice of other international courts and tribunals to explore whether their approach in 
dealing with situation involving multiple responsible actors reinforces the approach taken 
by the Court. Our aim is to inquire whether they also demonstrate a tendency to turn to 
fundamentals of international responsibility in such situations and whether their practice 
indicates whether a rule or principle within their specific systems or generally exists 
governing the allocation of the obligation to make reparation among multiple responsible 
actors. 
Certain other judicial institutions despite being far more remedies-oriented have also yet to 
articulate a general principle on the allocation of the obligation to make reparation among 
multiple responsible actors that goes beyond the existing basic principles of the regime of 
international responsibility. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), for example, 
is the court that can be considered as the one most often confronted with a plurality of 
wrongdoing actors,336 often of a very different nature. There three cases before the ECtHR 
reaffirming the conclusions to which we have arrived so far. First, in MSS v Belgium and 
Greece, the court was confront with a situation of shared responsibility involving two 
responsible States both parties to the Convention system.337 Second, in El Masri v 
Macedonia the responsibility was shared between a States party to the Convention and a 
State not bound by the Convention.338 Finally, in Fadeyeva v Russia the Court held a State 
party responsible in connection to the actions of a non-state actor.339 In all these cases, the 
ECtHR has turned to the primary obligations of the State party to the Convention before it 
and despite concerns340 about the clarity of the reasoning and the exact rules upon which 
the determination was based it has granted just satisfaction to the victims.  
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Two cases also from the realm of international arbitration illustrate this point. In the CME 
v Czech Republic the investment tribunal dealt with the issue of ‘joint tortfeasors’, 
following the conceptual framework set by the ILC in the ARSIWA, ‘even [if] in a 
superficial and sloppy manner’ and awarded damages to the investor by utilizing the basic 
rule that the existence of concurrent causes does not diminishes a State’s own 
responsibility for the breach.341 The Eurotunnel arbitration, on the other hand, 
demonstrated that in order for the principle of joint and several responsibility to be 
established one needs to look at the pertinent inter-State relationship, as reflected in an 
international agreement or otherwise, and to find evidence of the will to establish such a 
principle of responsibility for the case at hand.342  
Finally, even in the context of the advisory function which is not technically speaking 
limited by the strict application of the principle of consent there has been no elaboration of 
a general rule but rather application of the fundamental rules of state responsibility and 
utilization of the primary obligations at issue. For instance, if we look at the Seabed 
Disputes Chamber’s Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and 
Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area advisory opinion, which directly grappled 
with the principle of joint and several liability between multiple responsible entities, we 
will see that sponsoring States will be called upon to compensate for damage caused by a 
sponsored contractors but only in the event that they themselves have not carried out their 
obligations under the LOSC and relevant regulations of the Seabed Authority including  
their obligation of due diligence. Their obligation to make reparation will only apply if 
such violation is causally linked to the damage caused.343 A similar conclusion was 
reached by the ITLOS in the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission Advisory Opinion, 
where the Tribunal concluded that ‘the liability of the flag State does not arise from a 
failure of vessels flying its flag to comply with the laws and regulations…[but] from its 
failure to comply with its “due diligence” obligations concerning IUU fishing activities 
conducted by vessels flying its flag’.344 It is notable that both the Seabed Disputes 
Chamber and ITLOS, in handing down their opinions, have relied on the general rules of 																																																								
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international responsibility, in particular the principle of independent responsibility, 
causation, and full reparation, recognizing however some of their limitations.345 
3. Interim Conclusions 
The consequence that follows from this is more or less apparent. Rather than articulating 
grand principles applicable in each and every case that multiple responsible States or actors 
have caused a single injury, the ICJ has taken a flexible, context-specific approach directed 
at resolving the dispute at hand essentially looking at the primary obligations of each actor 
before it and the basic rules of international responsibility. This practice has been affirmed 
by that of other international courts and tribunals that follow a similar approach when 
dealing with cases involving multiple responsible actors. 
At the present stage of development of international law, we cannot conclude that the 
practice of the Court hints to the existence of any general principle or rule regulating the 
allocation of the obligation to make reparation among multiple responsible actors. The 
flexibility with which it deals with the question of remedies and reparation is not 
conducive to the emergence of such grand principle in the near future either. Rather three 
other points emerge from the Court’s practice examined in this chapter. First, the Court 
despite its very tight cadre juridique has not so far shied away from deciding cases 
involving issues of shared responsibility. Second, its approach—perhaps one could argue 
overtly traditional—shows a clear preference for dealing with such situations utilizing 
rules and principles already at its disposal and then turning to the fundamental principles of 
state responsibility to establish responsibility and find the most appropriate remedy. These 
include the principle of independent responsibility and ‘full reparation’. Finally, any 
discontent or uneasiness towards the Court’s conclusions in these cases stems more from 
the muddled application of the traditional rules rather than from a feeling that the Court 
lacks the tools necessary to resolve such situations. The Corfu Channel and Bosnian 
Genocide cases, where the not so reasoned award of damages and application of the causal 
test respectively raised many questions, are two examples of this problem.   
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General Conclusions 
According to Philipp Heck ‘while [the judge] must decide the individual case before him, 
he does so by applying the entire legal order’.346 The present dissertation has demonstrated 
that this is indeed how the ICJ and other international courts and tribunals have so far dealt 
with situations involving multiple responsible actors.  
The obligation to make reparation constitutes the necessary corollary of international 
responsibility and an essential remedy to the party injured by the internationally wrongful 
act. As straightforward as this might be the obligation as such is characterized by 
intricacies and inherent complexities that affect its realization before international courts 
and tribunals. The diverse approach taken by different adjudicatory bodies towards 
remedies as well as the flexibility displayed by the ICJ in their award reveals that these 
matters are complicated and less straightforward than they appear at first sight.  
Despite the fact that an increasing number of cases that come before international courts 
and tribunals involving multiple responsible actors, the review of the practice of the ICJ 
and beyond reveals that the adjudication of these matters takes place on the basis of the 
first principles of international responsibility and the primary obligations that bind each 
responsible actor. Even if this may be considered unsatisfactory from a normative 
perspective or as a policy choice, it indeed offers the best solution given the circumstances 
at hand. The ILC in its codification work on the topic of international responsibility offered 
little guidance on how situations of shared responsibility should be handled and how the 
obligation to make reparations shall be apportioned among multiple responsible actors. 
The international practice on the topic is scarce, whereas international dispute settlement is 
fundamentally based on a bilateral approach to and structure of international relations.  
Taking all this into consideration, one cannot but praise the ICJ and other international 
courts for not shying away from adjudicating cases involving such complex issues, and for 
handling them by utilizing a network of primary obligations and first principles of 
international responsibility. This sober approach to such complex questions would be of 
course enhanced if the Court ventured more into detailed reasoning of its decisions and 
clearer articulation of the various tools in operation. 
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